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A QUESTION OF JUSTICE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE 1883 CIVIL RIGHTS
CASES*
MARIANNE L. ENGELMAN LADO**
INTRODUCTION
"The colored people of the United States feel to-day as if they
had been baptized in ice water," an outraged T. Thomas Fortune, edi-
tor of the New York Globe, wrote on October 20, 1883.1 A few days
earlier, the Supreme Court had declared the first two sections of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional. The Civil Rights Act had
guaranteed all citizens equal access to places of public accommoda-
tion, such as inns, railroads, and theaters, and had provided for en-
forcement in federal court.2 Fortune was not alone in expressing a
strong reaction to the Court's decision. During the ensuing weeks, the
Civil Rights Cases were denounced, debated, and discussed in meet-
ings3 and in newspapers, 4 among the small number of African Ameri-
cans admitted to the bar and among those without formal legal
training. For the majority of African-American political leaders, reli-
gious figures, and editors, whose thoughts have been preserved in
printed form, the Court's opinion was a profound disappointment, the
probable end of an era in which some hope had remained that the
federal government would provide legal protection of the rights of
citizenship.
* The author wishes to thank Luke Charles Harris, Walter Murphy, Jennifer Hochschild,
Andrew Koppelman, and, especially, Albert Raboteau for their advice and encouragement.
** Assisant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
1. T. Thomas Fortune, The Civil Rights Decision, N.Y. GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1883, at 2, re-
printed in LESLIE H. FISHEL, JR. & BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO AMERICAN: A DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY 315 (1967).
This Article contains numerous quotations from newspaper articles in the 1880s. All origi-
nal spellings and capitalizations have been retained to reflect the intent of the authors.
2. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
3. See, e.g., The Colored People of Kansas, ARK. MANSION, Dec. 22, 1883, at 1 (quoting a
report from the Detroit Plaindealer regarding a "largely attended meeting" of African Ameri-
cans in Kansas); Resolutions of Civil Rights Congress, 1883, Adopted at the Civil Rights Mass
Meeting Held at Lincoln Hall in Washington D.C. (Oct. 22, 1883), in 2 A DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 658-59 (Herbert Aptheker ed., 1951)
[hereinafter Resolutions].
4. See, e.g., October and November editions of the New York Globe, Arkansas Mansion,
Cleveland Gazette, People's Advocate (Washington, D.C.), and the State Journal (Harrisburg,
Pa.).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
This Article examines what the voices of black America said in
1883 about a variety of jurisprudential issues. The Article draws upon
responses to the Civil Rights Cases to examine the range of African-
American opinions on the origin and nature of both law and rights;
the authority and jurisdiction of the courts and Congress; constitu-
tional meaning and interpretation generally, and as to the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments in particular; and judicial discretion, its limits, and
the deliberative process. Section I provides a brief summary of the
Civil Rights Cases. Section II presents the vast and varied array of
African-American responses to the Cases. Section III focuses on Jus-
tice and Jurisprudence,5 a heartfelt and lengthy legal argument against
the Cases and other matters involving construction of the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Article concludes with an analysis
of the general themes and commonalities appearing in the record of
African-American perspectives on the law in the years following
Reconstruction.
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
By the time the Supreme Court heard and decided the Civil
Rights Cases, the national government had largely abandoned the
cause of civil rights.6 The Supreme Court had already frustrated the
intentions of the Reconstruction Republicans by striking down or lim-
iting the main body of civil rights law.7 Given both the negligible
chance of vindication in federal court, as well as the general climate of
intimidation and intolerance, it is little wonder that by 1883 few blacks
were bringing suit under the Civil Rights Act.8 Many viewed the law
5. BROTHERHOOD OF LIBERTY, JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE: AN INQUIRY CONCERNING
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE THIRTEENTH, FOURTEENTH. AND FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENTS (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1889) (hereinafter JUSTICE AND JURISPRU-
DENCE). The Brotherhood of Liberty was a group of African-American activists.
6. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
586-87 (1988).
7. See generally RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO 105-25 (Collier
Books 1965) (1954).
8. The Court's delay in issuing a ruling on the Cases created uncertainty about the law and
may have discouraged additional litigation. See Valeria W. Weaver, The Failure of Civil Rights
1875-1883 and Its Repercussions, 54 J. NEGRO HIST. 368, 369-70 (1969).
Despite the general acknowledgment of the Act's impotency in the face of white prejudice
and disinterest, many African Americans continued to press for redress under its terms. See,
e.g., A NEGRO ATTORNEY TESTIFIES AGAINST SEGREGATED TRAVEL, 1883, S. REP. ON LABOR
AND CAPITAL, testimony, vol. iv, at 382 (1883), in BLACK PROTEST. HISTORY, DOCUMENTS AND
ANALYSES 1619 TO THE PRESENT 163-64 (Joanne Grant ed., 1968) (statement of J.A. Scott of
Birmingham, Alabama, reporting on discriminatory treatment of African Americans by the rail-
roads and complaints made to the railroad commission in 1883). Even as late as 1883, complain-
ants were still bringing suit pursuant to the Act to challenge segregatory policies and practices.
See, e.g., N.Y. GLOBE, Aug. 25, 1883, at 2 (reporting on a decision sentencing a restauranteur to a
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as a dead letter.9 The Court's pronouncement in the Civil Rights
Cases nevertheless confirmed in official terms the effective death of
the Act.'0 As a columnist for the Cleveland Gazette wrote in late Oc-
tober, "The Civil Rights bill lingered unconsciously nearly nine years
and died on the 15th of October, 1883, without a struggle. Although
its death was not wholly unexpected, it was, after all, a great shock to
the colored race and occasioned a profound feeling throughout the
country.""
Four of the five cases jointly considered by the Supreme Court in
the Civil Rights Cases were criminal prosecutions for denial of hotel
and theatre privileges on the basis of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.' 2 The fifth was a civil action brought by Richard and
Sallie Robinson after a conductor on the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad refused to allow Mrs. Robinson passage in the ladies' car
because "she was a person of African descent.' 3 The constitutional
validity of the first two sections of the Act was at issue in all five
cases. 14
$500 fine or thirty days in jail for refusing to serve a man of color); N.Y. GLOBE, Sept. 29, 1883,
at 2 (reporting on and opposing an offer of compromise made by the Texas railroads by which
the railroad would furnish equal but separate accommodations); Civil Rights, ARK. MANSION,
Nov. 10, 1883, at 1 (discussion of Laport v. St L., L.M. & N. Ry., a suit brought under Arkansas's
statute for the forcible eviction of an African-American woman from a first class car).
9. See FONER, supra note 6, at 556; Hon. John P. Green, Civil Rights: Deep Game Being
Played by Arthur Politicians-What Next?, CLv. GAZETrE, Oct. 20, 1883, at 2 (arguing that the
Civil Rights Act was of no practical utility in the South, where "it was never true that a colored
man could get any accommodations equal with those given to the whites in that section"); Reso-
lutions of National Convention at Louisville, September 1883, quoted in Equal Rights, ARK.
MANSION, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1 ("It should be remembered that at the National Convention at
Louisville we pronounced the civil rights amendments a dead letter in which the supreme court
has only concurred."). African Americans were not alone in their recognition of the inefficacy
of the Act. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases Decided, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1883, at 4 (suggesting that
the decision was unlikely to have much of an impact, since the Act had never been enforced).
10. As Albert P. Blaustein and. Robert L. Zangrando wrote, "The Civil Rights Cases of
1883 confirmed the fact that the national government was officially abandoning the Negro to the
caprice of state control." CIVIL RiGrs AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO: A DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY 283 (Albert P. Blaustein & Robert L. Zangrando eds., 1968). By removing any semblance
of federal protection for the rights of African Americans, the Civil Rights Cases and a number of
other cases from this time ushered in and made possible the era of Jim Crow. Id.; LoGAN, supra
note 7, at 114-18; HAROLD M. HYMAN & WitI.AM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITnTONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 498-500 (1982).
11. Xenia-Numerous Notes-Politics-Civil Rights, CLEv. GAZETTE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 2.
12. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4 (1883) (syllabus of the Court) (United States v.
Stanley (hotel accommodations), United States v. Ryan (theatre privileges), United States v.
Nichols (hotel accommodations), and United States v. Singleton (theatre privileges)).
13. Id. at 4-5.
14. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which was entitled "An Act to Protect all
Citizens in their Civil And Legal Rights," provided:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of
inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amuse-
19951
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The Court held, first, that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
against interference with rights held by citizens only if perpetrated by
instrumentalities of the state. In Justice Bradley's words: "Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the amend-
ment."'1 5 The Court concluded that since the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited only discriminatory actions by the state, congressional au-
thority was limited to "corrective legislation," or the prohibition of
state violations of constitutional rights.16 The actions of private indi-
viduals were subject only to state civil rights laws. To rule otherwise,
the Court maintained, would be to allow Congress to supersede state
power to regulate the private relations "between man and man.' 17
According to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment did not author-
ize Congress to forbid discriminatory practices by owners and opera-
tors of accommodations, conveyances, or places of amusement.
Neither did the Thirteenth Amendment authorize the Act.'8
While the Court recognized Congress's "right to enact all necessary
and proper laws for the obliteration and prevention of slavery with all
its badges and incidents,"' 9 Justice Bradley's opinion rejected the ar-
gument that denial of access to an inn, conveyance, or theatre consti-
tuted a badge or incident of slavery.20 The Court found that the right
to freedom established by the Thirteenth Amendment did not include
"the social rights of men and races in the community."'2'
Justice Harlan was the sole member of the Court to dissent. He
criticized the majority for construing the Amendments so as to defeat
the ends for which they were adopted.22 In a passage much quoted by
African-American newspapers, he wrote:
Constitutional provisions adopted in the interest of liberty, and for
the purpose of securing, through the national legislation, if need be,
rights inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to American
citizenship, have been so construed as to defeat the ends the people
desired to accomplish, which they attempted to accomplish, and
ment; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable
alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of
servitude.
Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875). Section 2 set applicable civil and
criminal penalties for violation of the law. See Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 2, 18 Stat. 335,
336 (1875).
15. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
16. Id. at 13-14.
17. Id. at 13.
18. Id. at 20-25.
19. Id at 21.
20. l at 23-24.
21. Id. at 22.
22. Id. at 26.
[Vol. 70:1123
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which they supposed they had accomplished by changes in their fun-
damental law.
23
Harlan argued, further, that the majority had departed from rules of
interpretation that require "that full effect be given to the intent with
which [constitutional provisions] were adopted. '24
More specifically, he protested the Court's narrow interpretation
of the requirements of freedom under the Thirteenth Amendment.
Since the institution of slavery rested upon the inequality of those
held in bondage, "their freedom necessarily involved immunity from,
and protection against, all discrimination against them, because of
their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other
races."
2 5
Justice Harlan's discussion of Congressional authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment also starkly contrasted with that of the ma-
jority's. Harlan argued that Section 5, the Enabling Clause,26 granted
Congress the authority to enforce all provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, not merely those clauses interpreted to prohibit only
discriminatory state action. The affirmative grant of citizenship to all
persons born or naturalized in the United States, made explicit in the
amendment's first section,27 secured for the freeman the rights of citi-
zenship. Thus, he asserted, the amendment conferred upon Congress
the authority to enact legislation of a direct character to enforce those
rights.28 He contrasted the Court's decision to deny Congress the
power to enforce civil rights when individuals violate the civil rights of
others with the Supreme Court's previous willingness to grant Con-
gress the power to enforce a slaveowner's right to recover his slave on
claim.
29
With tragic prescience, Harlan commented that the Court's inter-
pretation of the Reconstruction Amendments would enter the nation
upon a regrettable era in constitutional law, "when the rights of free-
dom and American citizenship cannot receive from the nation that
23. Id.; see also The Civil Rights Decision: The Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan,
PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 24, 1883, at 2; Our Opinions of Justice Harlan's
Views, ARK. MANSION, Dec. 1, 1883, at 1.
24. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26.
25. Id. at 36.
26. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
27. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: "All persons born or natural-
ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 50.
29. See, e.g., id. at 33-34, 53.
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efficient protection which heretofore was unhesitatingly accorded to
slavery and the rights of the master. '30
II. REACTIONS AND RESPONSES
In North and South, African Americans reacted to the Court's
decision with shock and profound dismay. An account of the immedi-
ate response to an announcement of the decision made at an opera-
house in Atlanta, Georgia is telling: "[T]he quietude of the colored
gallery was noticeable. Not a note of applause came from those sol-
emn rows of benches; their occupants were dum-founded. The feeling
of the colored people to-day is deep .... -131 Many African-American
speakers, writers, and editors found the Cases reminiscent of Dred
30. Id. at 57. As noted above, Harlan had strong words for the Court's method of constitu-
tional construction and resultant failure to give effect to the intended meaning of legislation
enacted in the exercise of the powers granted to Congress. Id. at 27, 52. Harlan also refuted the
Court's positions that the activities prohibited by the Act do not meet the requirements of state
action, id. at 42, and that the rights encompassed by the Act were "social rights," id. at 59.
Harlan's views effectively prevailed more than eighty years after the Civil Rights Cases. In
response to the growing movement for civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243 (1964), the Second Title of which strongly resembled the
Act ruled unconstitutional in the Cases. Title II guarantees all persons "the full and equal enjoy-
ment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place
of public accommodation... without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1988). Places of public accommodation in-
clude inns, restaurants, and places of public amusement, provided that the operation of the es-
tablishment at issue affects interstate commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1988). In two cases,
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964), the Court avoided direct conflict with precedent by holding Title II constitu-
tional as an exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce, the ground left open by the
majority in the Civil Rights Cases. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 280 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (agreeing with the Court's decision based on the Commerce Clause, but arguing that
the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to prohibit racial discrimination in places of
public accommodation and is a better basis for the decision). The central holding of the Civil
Rights Cases-i.e., that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments did not authorize Congress
to regulate private acts of discrimination-was finally laid to rest in a line of cases considering
the constitutionality and construction of other provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1968. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968)
(holding that the Enabling Clause of the Thirteen Amendment empowered Congress to prohibit
all discrimination against Negroes in the sale or rental of property-discrimination by private
owners as well as discrimination by public authorities.); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
782-83 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I acknowledge that... an
aspect of the Civil Rights Cases [has] declared that Congress' power under § 5 is confined to the
adoption of 'appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of ... prohibited State laws and
State acts . . . .' I do not accept-and a majority of the Court today rejects-this interpretation
of § 5.").
31. The Civil Rights Decision: Divided Feeling in Atlanta on the Vexed Question, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 1883, at 1. The 7imes report captured the considerably divergent feelings the
Court's ruling engendered along the color line in Atlanta. Whereas the announcement had been
met by silence in the gallery, there was a "wild scene" in the white section of the audience, where
"men stood on their feet and cheered and ladies gave approving smiles." Id.
[Vol. 70:1123
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Scott,3 2 in that the Cases echoed the notion that African Americans
had no rights whites were bound to respect. 33 Many were also quick
to point out that one of greatest ironies of the Court's ruling was its
inconsistency with Dred Scott. Whereas in Dred Scott the Court had
upheld Congressional power to protect and enforce the property
rights of slave-owning citizens, 34 in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court
denied Congress the power to protect the rights of citizenship and re-
ferred African Americans to the states for redress. This, despite the
passage of constitutional amendments explicitly intended to expand
congressional authority to protect rights. While some, like John Mer-
cer Langston, optimistically spoke of the day when liberty would pre-
vail, others expressed bitterly that the recent grant of citizenship, a
grant hard earned in wartime, had proved hollow.
A. Meetings and Speeches
T. Thomas Fortune, editor of the New York Globe, reported that
"[flrom Maine to Florida," the colored people of the United States
"are earnestly discussing the decision of the Supreme Court .... Pub-
lic meetings are being projected far and wide to give expression to the
common feeling of disappointment and apprehension for the fu-
ture. ' 35 On November 20, the Washington correspondent to the Ar-
kansas Mansion likewise wrote, "The recent civil rights decision of the
supreme court has been a prolific topic here, and some of our colored
population are a good deal exercised. ' 36 Indeed, meetings were held
32. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
33. See, e.g., Frederick Douglass, The Civil Rights Case, Speech at the Civil Rights Mass-
Meeting Held at Lincoln Hall in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 22, 1883), in NEGRO SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THOUGTrr 1850-1920: REPREsENTATIvE TEXTS 298-306 (Howard Brotz ed., 1966);
Henry McNeal Turner, Letter to the Editor of the New York Voice (Jan. 4, 1889), in RESPECr
BLAcK: Tim WRrrNGS AND SPEECHES OF HENRY McNEAL TURNER 65, 66 (Edwin S. Redkey
ed., 1971) [hereinafter RESPEcr BLACK] ("Talk about the 'Dred Scott' decision; why it was only
a mole-hill in comparison with this obstructing Rocky Mountain to the freedom of citizenship.");
Civil Rights, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1.
34. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 452 (indicating that Congress had the power and duty
of "guarding and protecting the owner in his rights"). The Court interpreted the Constitution as
recognizing the primacy of a master's rights of property and as delegating to the government in
express terms the power to protect such property rights. Id. at 451-52. The vaulted position of
property rights led to the Court's central holding, that Congress lacked authority to ban slavery
from the territories and that such prohibitions against slavery worked to deprive citizens of their
property in violation of due process.
35. Fortune, supra note 1, at 315; see also Civil Rights-Opinions of the Press--and Leading
Men of the Country, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 17, 1883, at 1 (excerpt from the Arkansas Dispatch
stating, in part: "The colored people in many places are holding indignation meetings because
the United States [S]upreme [C]ourt decided the civil rights bill unconstitutional.").
36. Washington Letter, ARK. MANSION, Dec. 1, 1883, at 1. The Washington correspondent
had reported in late October that "in several cities throughout the country the colored citizens
19951
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in Washington, New York, Philadelphia,37 Pittsburgh, 38 Cleveland,39
St. Louis,40 Chicago,4' Columbus, 42 Louisville,43 Springfield, Mis-
souri,"4 Birmingham,45 Norwich, Connecticut,46 and in Texas.47
The Civil Rights Cases "were greeted with an indignant rally in
Philadelphia almost as big as those which had celebrated [the passage
of the Act] eight years before."48 One meeting of African Americans
in Texas, which was called to express indignation over the Court's rul-
ing, created more than a stir. The Topeka Tribune reported that after
participants had driven out two "bullying" white men who attempted
to interrupt the meeting, chaos ensued: "[M]ore whites rushed in and
were promptly repulsed-some cowardly justice of the peace hur-
riedly telegraphed the governor of a 'nigger uprising'; this good soul
ordered out the whole state militia to put down-a public meeting
which would not be intruded." 49 Most gatherings ended more peace-
had called indignation meetings to denounce the Civil Rights decision." From Washington, ARK.
MANSION, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1.
37. See, e.g., ROGER LANE, WiLiAM DORSEY'S PHILADELP A AND OURS: ON THE PAST
AND FUTURE OF THE BLACK CITY IN AMERICA 12 (1991) (citing THE TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1883).
38. See John W. Anderson, et al., Pittsburgh: Personals-A Civil Rights Mass Meeting-
Politics, CLEv. GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 1883, at 2.
39. See Civil Rights-The Harmonious and Enthusiastic Mass Meeting at Halcyon Hall Last
Monday Evening, Ct.v. GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 1883, at 2.
40. See Our Western Letter-Civil Rights Mass Meeting of St. Louis Colored Citizens, at
Which Hon. J. Milton Turner Orates, CI.Ev. GAZETTE, Dec. 1, 1883, at 4.
41. "The Devil or Ben Butler", N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1883, at 1 (reporting with disapproval
on the remarks of Rev. W. Polk who, at a meeting in his Chicago church, denounced the decision
as an insult to the race and advised African-American voters to give their allegiance to the party
that would give African Americans their rights).
42. State Capital-Gleanings from Columbus-The Supreme Court's Decision Still the
Leading Topic-Colored Men Call a Meeting, Civ. GAZETTE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1.
43. African Americans in Louisville held more than one meeting. See Address to the
Colored People of Louisville, ARK. MANSION, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1; Civil Rights-Opinions of the
Press-and Leading Men of the Country, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 17, 1883, at 1; The Colored Peo-
ple of Kansas, ARK. MANSION, Dec. 22, 1883, at 1 (reporting on a meeting in Kansas and the
resolutions adopted for presentation to Congress).
44. Better Than the Civil Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1883, at 4 (reporting on a "colored
mass-meeting" that convened on October 30, during which "appeals were made for 'united ac-
tion and earnest demands for the rights' of the race").
45. See Colored Citizens of Birmingham on the Civil Rights Decision, HursviLLE GA-
zTTE (Alabama), Nov. 17, 1883, at 2; State News, HuNTsviLLE GAZETTE (Alabama), Nov. 10,
1883, at 2.
46. See Insisting on Their Rights-The Colored Citizen's Convention of the State of Connect-
icut, STATE J. (Harrisburg, Pa.), Jan. 5, 1884, at 2; A Movement for Civil Rights, STATE J. (Harris-
burg, Pa.), Dec. 15, 1883.
47. For discussion of additional meetings, see, e.g., ARK. MANSION, Nov. 3, 1883 (mass
meeting of African Americans in Keokuk resolved to ask Iowa's legislature to adopt the sections
of the Civil Rights Bill declared unconstitutional by the Court); Civil Rights, ARK. MANSION,
Nov. 10, 1883, at 1 (coverage of Illinois convention).
48. LANE, supra note 37, at 12 (citing the THE TiMs, Oct. 18, 1883).
49. ARK. MANSION, Nov. 17, 1883, at 1 (excerpt from Topeka Tribune (Kansas)). See also
News and Notes, HuNTsviLLE GAZETTE (Alabama), Nov. 3, 1883, at 3 (reporting as erroneous
[Vol. 70:1123
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fully. A mass meeting in Birmingham, Alabama, produced a series of
resolutions condemning the decision and declaring that to deprive Af-
rican Americans of the enjoyment of the right to equal accommoda-
tions is to "conflict with a right ... common to all men."' 50 Those
assembled appointed five men to a committee to present grievances to
the railroads in Alabama and to request a plan to ensure that African
Americans enjoy as good accommodations as any other race when
paying the same fare.51
Prominent lawyers such as John Mercer Langston spoke out
against the Court's decision and hailed Justice Harlan's dissent. "Not
within the memory of the oldest inhabitants," the New York Globe
reported, "has ever before so large, refined and highly representative
an audience assembled to hear any man as the one that greeted the
Hon. John Mercer Langston. '52 On Friday, October 19, Langston,
then U.S. Consul General to Haiti, delivered a lecture entitled "Status
of the Colored American, His Relationships and His Duties" to a
standing-room-only crowd in Washington, D.C.'s First Congregational
Church.53 Langston was joined on stage by other African American
leaders, including Frederick Douglass and Blanche K. Bruce, ex-Sena-
tor from Mississippi and then-Register of the U.S. Treasury. The
event was ushered by students at Howard University's School of Law,
of which Langston had been the first dean.54 Langston argued that
the postwar amendments authorized the Civil Rights Act. Specifi-
cally, he contended that the Act had merely explained preexisting
rights and provided for their protection. He denied that the Court
an initial press dispatch suggesting that a mob of 500 African Americans in Milan County, Texas,
had threatened havoc).
50. Colored Citizens of Birmingham on the Civil Rights Decision, HUNTSVILLE GAZETTE
(Alabama), Nov. 17, 1883, at 2.
51. Id.
52. The Civil Rights Law: Hon. John Mercer Langston Defines Citizenship and the Rights
Attaching to It, N.Y. GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 2.
53. Id.; Civil Rights Law-The Harmonious and Enthusiastic Mass Meeting at Halcyon Hall
Last Monday Evening, CLv. GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 1883, at 2 (an extract from Hon. John Mercer
Langston's Great Lecture). The Globe reported that people began to congregate in front of the
church two hours before doors were to open and, by seven o'clock, more than a thousand per-
sons stood ready to enter. The Civil Rights Law: Hon. John Mercer Langston Defines Citizenship
and the Rights Attaching to It, N.Y. GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 2. See also descriptions of the event
in Jesse Lawson, The Civil Rights Demonstration, N.Y. GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1883, at 2.
Langston also spoke about the Cases to an audience in New York. See Civil Rights: Opin-
ions of the Press, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1 (excerpt from coverage by the Southwestern
Christian Advocate).
54. Jesse Lawson, The Civil Rights Demonstration, N.Y. GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1883, at 2.
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could legitimately deprive African Americans of the legal mechanisms
necessary to preserve their citizenship.55
"The Supreme Court would seem desirous of remanding us back
to that old passed condition," Langston stated, finding absurd the
Court's relegation of protection for civil rights to the states.56 "We
need and demand protection, and if States should not protect us
against abuse, against insults, against violation of our rights, Congress
should and must."'57 The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
Langston continued, were precisely intended to authorize such protec-
tion, and, in accordance with the authority granted by the amend-
ments, the Civil Rights Act had provided aggrieved individuals a
means of redress. To those who counseled African Americans to wait
for the states to act, he responded, "How long must we wait for
change of public opinion, and how long must we wait for State action
to give us our rights ... ?,,58
Langston compared the history of people of African descent in
the United States to the Biblical story of the Exodus from Egypt. He
noted that the founding documents of the nation-i.e., the Declara-
tion of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Consti-
tution-contained no language discriminating against colored persons
in awarding the privileges of citizenship. When the Constitution was
ratified, he argued, African Americans voted for the ratification.
"There came a time, however," he continued, "when those arose who
knew not Joseph." 59 Just as the new rulers of Egypt had enslaved the
Hebrews, so too the new country debased, disenfranchised, and dis-
criminated against African Americans. Emancipation was granted as
a war measure, but emancipation meant more than an absence of slav-
ery. "As we walked out of slavery, we walked into citizenship. '"60 The
Thirteenth Amendment was ratified to secure the rights of the freed-
men: "Out of slavery we have passed, as stated, into American citizen-
ship, a good deal like coming out of the land of Egypt into a promised
land, one flowing with milk and honey."'61
Langston recounted how the Civil Rights Law of 1866 had been
enacted to guarantee the colored man the rights essential to citizen-
55. The Civil Rights Law: Hon. John Mercer Langston Defines Citizenship and the Rights
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ship, including the rights to contract, and, also, to buy, sell, hold, con-
vey, and transfer property. Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment had
been ratified to eliminate all doubt that the rights of African Ameri-
cans were to be clearly defined and protected. 62
He then turned to the content of the Civil Rights Act and the
Court's recent decision. Before reading the text of the Act, he noted
three established principles that would guide his discussion: first, that
all persons born or naturalized in the United States are citizens of
both the United States and of the state in which they reside; second,
that neither Congress nor any state can make any law to abridge rights
belonging to any class of citizens; and third, that
All acts of either of the bodies named must be in conservation and
protection of the rights of the citizen, and when doubt may rise as to
the constitutionality of an act passed for such purpose such doubt
should be given in favor of the rights in question, especially where
the intent of the law is plain.63
Langston argued that the language of the Act, and especially of its
preamble,64 was unambiguous and carefully crafted, and was intended
to protect the already established rights of citizenship. "This law
then," he stated, "seems to be simply a declaratory statute explana-
tory of existing rights. It does not create our rights; it simply defines
and explains them. ' 65 Most importantly, the law furnished a means of
redress against violations. Thus, he contended, the Court should have
resolved any doubt in favor of the rights of citizenship. 66
"How is it possible," Langston asked, "for the Supreme Court...
to have reached the conclusion that the civil Rights Act, under the
circumstances, is unconstitutional?" He answered, "This is incompre-
hensible." 67 The Court had ignored the "doctrine of the 13th and 14th
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The preamble stated:
Whereas it is essential to just government we recognize the equality of all men before
the law, and hold that it is the duty of government in its dealings with the people to
mete out equal and exact justice to all whatever nativity, race, color or persuasion,
religious or political; and it being the appropriate object of legislation to enact great
fundamental principles into law: Therefore ....
Id. at 4 (quoting the Civil Rights Act of 1875).
65. Id. Langston also stated, more specifically, that the Civil Rights Act was passed pursu-
ant to the Fourteenth Amendment, with the following purposes:
first, as declaratory of the Civil Rights of the colored people of the country, already
made free and citizens of the United States; secondly, to correct the abusive and illegal
treatment of such class of our citizens by the people of the various States of the Union;






Amendments" and the "logic and law of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866
and 1875 .... ,"68 He then thanked the Court for at least limiting the
reach of its decision. Langston noted that federal protection within
the District of Columbia and the territories continued, since the Cases
limited federal protection only within the jurisdiction of the states.
Langston also indicated that the Court had sustained, "[b]y implica-
tion at least," common law protections that are enforceable in state
court and, upon further Congressional action, that would be enforcea-
ble in federal court.
69
What, then, was the condition of African Americans after the
Court's decision? "My colored friends, let us not despair," Langston
advised, "We are complete citizens, entitled to the full measure of
privileges and immunities as such."'70 Although the Court had left Af-
rican Americans without redress in federal court, except where viola-
tions occurred in the District of Columbia or federal territories, it had
recognized the correctness of common law doctrines and the duty of
the states to enforce their application.
71
African Americans gathered in Louisville, Kentucky on October
19 and listened to another address condemning the decision and ex-
horting the audience to action. The speaker called upon "the colored
citizens in every town and city in the state to assemble in public meet-
ings at once" in order that their views on the Cases be clearly and
promptly set forth.72 This speaker asked African Americans in Ken-
tucky to adopt a number of propositions, including, first, that the post-
war constitutional amendments established the citizenship of African
Americans, "which in so far as law is concerned means the same to
every man without distinction or discrimination upon any account
whatever. ' 73 Second, every citizen is entitled to his civil rights by "the
fundamental laws of the government," laws that could not be repealed
by the Supreme Court, nor by any of its decisions.74 Thus, as citizens,
African Americans could not be deprived of their civil rights by the
Court's ruling. Third, state courts, the means of enforcing civil rights
68. Id.
69. Langston considered common law rights to encompass the rights to contract and to bind
the other party to the contract. This includes, "[t]he simplest common law rights of which we
have any knowledge, the right to go upon railroad cars and be accommodated, where [we] have
first-class tickets to enable us to ride in first-class cars." Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Address to the Colored People of Louisville, ARK. MANSION, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1. The
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suggested by the Court, had always existed but were ineffectual. Con-
gress enacted the Civil Rights Act precisely because of the laxity of
the states. Fourth, although there existed increased support for civil
rights generally, and although advancements "in intelligence, wealth
and deportment" made by African Americans would lessen the need
for civil rights legislation in the future, nonetheless such advance-
ments were not a prerequisite to equal citizenship, and legislation re-
mained necessary to protect rights against "unjust forces. ' 75 Lastly,
the speaker called for a national organization of African Americans to
publicize the names of common carriers and other public accommoda-
tions that did not discriminate on the basis of race and to encourage
all African Americans to patronize these establishments.
76
Frederick Douglass delivered a speech about the Cases at a well-
attended mass meeting held at Lincoln Hall in Washington, D.C. on
October 22, 1883.77 The Cleveland Gazette's Washington correspon-
dent reported on the crowd gathered at Lincoln Hall: "There was no
standing room-there was scarcely breathing room. Stage and floor
were alike crowded. There were over 2,000 persons inside the doors
and double that number turned reluctantly away." 78 James M. Greg-
ory presided over and addressed the meeting, which was also attended
by various African-American and white leaders, including Blanche K.
Bruce, Richard T. Greener (professor and, later, dean of Howard's
law department), the Rev. Francis Grimke, and Robert G. Ingersoll.
79
Before Douglass's speech, the assembly unanimously adopted resolu-
75. Id
76. Id
77. Douglass, supra note 33, at 298. The text of Douglass's speech was reprinted and dis-
cussed in a number of African-American newspapers. See, e.g., Civil Rights Decision-An Im-
mense Mass Meeting of the Colored Citizens and Their Friends at Lincoln Hall, CLEv. GAZETTE,
Oct. 27, 1883, at 1. Some papers, including the Huntsville Gazette (Alabama) and the Cleveland
Gazette had even printed advance notices of the meeting. See Civil Rights Decision: Views of
Leading Colored Men, HUNTSVILLE GAZETTE (Alabama), Oct. 20, 1883, at 2 (reporting that
invited speakers included Fred Douglass, Col. Ingersoll, Rev. Dr. Raskin, Judge Shellarbarger,
Jeff Chandler, and Judge Riddle); Colored Men Disappointed- The Civil Rights Decision Re-
garded as a Step Backward, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 17, 1883, at 4; CLEv. GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 1883, at 2.
In its October 20 issue, the Huntsville Gazette also printed Douglass's initial statement on the
decision:
It is contrary to the Declaration of Independence, contrary to the spirit of Christianity,
contrary to the spirit of the age, and, as I think, in violation of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, and tends directly to make the colored people of the country
an aggrieved class, and to weakening [a] spirit of patriotism.
HUNTSVILLE GAZETTE (Alabama), Oct. 20, 1883, at 2. Douglass's speech is also reprinted in 4
PHIUP S. FONER, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DouoLAss 392 (1955).
78. Civil Rights Decision-An Immense Mass Meeting of the Colored Citizens and Their




tions affirming the duty of citizens to respect judicial decisions, calling
for the adoption of state measures to protect civil rights, and advising
the immediate organization of civil rights associations throughout the
country, "through which proper agitation and earnest work for our
cause may be inaugurated and carried out. '80
Though Douglass spoke after the Court had handed down its
judgment, he had not yet seen the full text or the dissenting opinion.
Douglass and his audience already knew, however, that the Court had
invalidated the Civil Rights Act and, without having read the fine
print, Douglass felt that "[flew events in our national history" sur-
passed the Supreme Court's decision in "magnitude, importance and
significance."' 81 He compared the significance and thrust of the deci-
sion to the effort to force slavery on the soil of Kansas, the enactment
of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, the repeal of the Missouri Compro-
mise, and the Dred Scott decision. The Court's judgment in the Cases
represented something other than a statement of principle or an inter-
pretation of text; the decision reflected the values of the nation and
stood in contradiction to the founding principle of liberty. Douglass
stated, "I look upon it as one more shocking development of that
moral weakness in high places which has attended the conflict be-
tween the spirit of liberty and the spirit of slavery from the beginning
"82
Although Douglass urged the gathering to respond to the deci-
sion without bitterness and advocated patient reform over violent
revolution, he argued that the duties of the citizenry and their govern-
ment are reciprocal. "[W]hile the people should frown down every
manifestation of levity and contempt for those in power, it is the duty
of the possessors of power so to use it as to deserve and to insure
respect and reverence. ' 83 And whereas governments are established
to secure the rights of human nature and to protect the weak and de-
fenseless from oppression, the Court's ruling denied the federal gov-
ernment the very powers necessary to pursue these ends.84
Douglass read aloud the first section of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Although he stated that he was disinclined to discuss the consti-
tutionality of the Court's decision, he proceeded with an analysis of
80. Id.; Resolutions, supra note 3, at 659.
81. Douglass, supra note 33, at 298.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 299.
84. Id. at 301. In view of the decision and the federal government's "utter destitution of
power" to protect citizens against violation of their rights, Douglass asked "what right have we
to call ourselves a Nation ... ?" Id.
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the Court's role within the constitutional framework and an examina-
tion of inconsistencies in the Court's constitutional interpretation. He
praised the nation's constitutional structure and, more specifically, the
distribution of powers among branches of the federal government.
The Supreme Court is, wisely, "the autocratic point in our National
Government," the branch with the "Supreme power of the Nation,"
Douglass stated, "and their decisions are law."' 85 The Court's judges,
Douglass continued, "live, and ought to live, an eagle's flight beyond
the reach of fear or favor, praise or blame, profit or loss. No vulgar
prejudice should touch the members of that Court anywhere. Their
decisions should come down to us like the calm, clear light of Infinite
justice. '8 6 Yet, the power of the Court to invalidate acts of Congress
should be exercised only under the most conclusive circumstances,
particularly when the law in question is "in favor of liberty and jus-
tice."' 87 Such a law "ought to have had the benefit of any doubt which
could arise as to its strict constitutionality." 88 To the contrary,
Douglass argued, the Court's decision had not been compelled by the
force of precedent or, more specifically, by the Constitution itself, but,
instead, reflected the Court's lack of commitment to the protection of
human rights. The Court could have followed prior methods of con-
stitutional interpretation and found the Act constitutional.89
Douglass discussed inconsistencies in the Court's method of con-
struing the Constitution and complained of "this sudden and causeless
reversal of all the great rules of legal interpretation by which this
Court was governed in other days." 9 For example, whereas the Court
had once relied on the intention of the framers to support its defense
of the slave trade and the Fugitive Slave Law, the Court now "utterly
ignored and rejected the force and application of object and intention
as a rule of interpretation."91 The Court now viewed the Fourteenth
85. Id. at 300.
86. Id
87. Id. In this regard, Douglass also told his audience, "[W]e cannot... overlook the fact
that ... this decision has inflicted a heavy calamity upon seven millions of the people of this
country, and left them naked and defenceless against the action of a malignant, vulgar, and
pitiless prejudice." Id. at 301.
88. Id. at 300.
89. Id. at 304-05.
90. Id. at 303.
91. Id. Douglass argued that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had intended to
prohibit discriminatory acts and not to make application of the Amendment contingent on the
instrument of discrimination. "What does it matter to a colored citizen that a State may not
insult and outrage him," Douglass asked, "if a citizen of a State may?" Id. at 305. Whether the
State or its members commit the act, Douglass continued,
The effect upon him is the same, and it was just this effect that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment plainly intended by that article to prevent.... [They] meant
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Amendment and the Act without regard to the broad and liberal spirit
in which they were enacted.92 Underlying the Court's change in posi-
tion was not principle untouched by prejudice, but, instead, the con-
tinuing spirit and power of slavery. Douglass charged that the Court
applied different rules of interpretation in order to achieve the partic-
ular outcomes that the Justices found acceptable, and he concluded,
"Where slavery was strong, liberty is now weak. '93
Douglass then turned to the symbolic value of the Court's action.
While some had downplayed the importance of the decision, feeling
that the Civil Rights Act was already lifeless, Douglass argued that the
law "though dead, did speak." 94 The Act had appealed to the best
instincts of the American people and had declared that all Americans
were equal citizens. He lamented, "The Supreme Court has hauled
down this flag of liberty in open day, and before all the people .... 95
to protect the newly enfranchised citizen from injustice and wrong, not merely from a
State, but from the individual members of a State. [They] meant to give him the pro-
tection to which his citizenship, his loyalty, his allegiance, and his services entitled him,
and this meaning, and this purpose, and this intention, is now declared ... void ....
Id.
92. Id. at 305.
93. Id. at 304. "In the dark days of slavery," Douglass stated, the Court allowed the inten-
tion of the framers to guide interpretation, even if, in the process, the plain language of the
Constitution and the benefits of liberty were sacrificed as a result. Id. at 303-04. "0 for a
Supreme Court of the United States which shall be as true to the claims of humanity as the
Supreme Court formerly was to the demands of slavery!" Id. at 304.
94. Id. at 305.
95. Id. In the final portion of his speech, Douglass defended the Civil Rights Act against
those who argued that it protected social, not civil rights. Douglass distinguished between civil
rights and social equality and, in the final passage of his speech, Douglass argued, "If [the civil
rights bill] is a Bill for social equality, so is the Declaration of Independence, which declares that
all men have equal rights; so is the Sermon on the Mount, so is the Golden Rule .... " Id. at 306.
For more on Douglass's distinction between civil rights and claims for social equality, see John
W. Anderson et al., Pittsburgh. A Strong Civil Rights Argument from the Keystone State-The
Atlanta Constitution Roughly Handled, CLEv. GAZETTE, Nov. 24, 1883, at 2 (text of Douglass's
address to the 1883 national convention). For further discussion of the distinction, see also MAU-
RINE CHRISTOPHER, BLACK AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 59 (1976) (discussing views of Rep. John
R. Lynch); Richard H. Cain, A Speech on the Civil Rights Bill, in CARTER G. WOODSON, NE-
GRO ORATORS AND THEm ORATIONS 328, 329 (1925) (speech by Rep. Cain before the Con-
gress); T. Thomas Fortune, Civil Rights and Social Privileges, 2 A.M.E. CHURCH REV. 119, 128-
31 (1885); John R. Lynch, A Speech on the Civil Rights Bill, in NEGRO ORATORS AND THEm
ORATIONS, supra, at 356, 363-67 (speech by Rep. John R. Lynch before Congress).
Douglass again discussed the Cases in April 1888, during a historic address delivered at a
Washington celebration of the twenty-sixth anniversary of emancipation in the District of Co-
lumbia. Frederick Douglass, I Denounce the So-Called Emancipation as a Stupendous Fraud,
Speech Before a Gathering in Washington D.C. Celebrating the Twenty-Sixth Anniversary of
Emancipation (Apr. 16, 1888), in THE VOICE OF BLACK AMERICA: MAJOR SPEECHES BY NE-
GROES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1797-1971, at 520 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1972) [hereinafter VoicE
OF BLACK AMERICA] (reprinted from WASH. NAT'L REPUBLICAN, Apr. 17, 1888). The true ob-
ject of government, Douglass contended, "is to protect the weak against the encroachments of
the strong, to hold its strong arm of justice over all the civil relations of its citizens and to see that
all have an equal chance in the race of life." Id. at 531. Instead, however, in the case of African-
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An assembly "of ladies and gentlemen" in Cleveland discussed
the Cases and adopted resolutions that mirrored those ratified by the
meeting at Lincoln Hall.96 In recognition of the inadequacy of en-
trusting protection of civil rights to either the common law or the
good will of white citizens, the gathering resolved to organize civil
rights groups throughout the country and to petition the President to
recommend Congressional action to protect the civil rights of African
Americans.97
"Monday evening, November 19, Mercantile Library Hall was the
center of attraction to a major portion of the colored populace of St.
Louis," the Cleveland Gazette reported.98 A standing-room-only
crowd of men and women convened to discuss the decision. After
electing officers to guide the deliberations and listening to some pre-
liminary remarks, the assembly, which included "a goodly share of
white as well as colored citizens," 99 heard an address by J. Milton Tur-
ner, who denounced the decision and branded the Court's conclusion
as fallacious. Speaking further, he reminded his audience "that the
Supreme court was but the servant of the people of these United
States, and that the sovereign will of the people must be obeyed." 1°°
In order to make their voices heard and, thus, to remedy the situation,
he urged African Americans to cast their ballots to call the Republi-
can party to task.10 1
American citizens, the national government "tacitly protects the strong in its encroachments
upon the weak." I& Douglass repeated his belief that the federal government had the power to
protect the rights of citizenship. "If it has not this right," he stated, "it is destitute of the funda-
mental quality of a government." Id. at 562.
96. Civil Rights-The Harmonious and Enthusiastic Mass Meeting at Halcyon Hall Last
Monday Evening, CiEv. GAZErrE, Nov. 3, 1883, at 2.
97. Id. Like the resolutions passed by the Washington assembly, the resolutions adopted in
Cleveland included provisions stating that it was the duty of all citizens, without respect to party
lines, to ensure that the full and equal protection of the laws is afforded all without regard to
race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and that African Americans should support the
political party that gave force and meaning to previous pledges for the protection of civil rights.
The resolutions adopted in Cleveland also stated, "That the progress of the colored American
citizen in morals, education, frugality, industry, and general usefulness, as a man, and as a citi-
zen, makes it a part of sound policy and wisdom to maintain and protect him in the enjoyment of
the fullest and most complete rights of citizenship." Id.
98. Our Western Letter-Civil Rights Mass Meeting of St. Louis Colored Citizens, at Which
Hon. J. Milton Turner Orates, Ct~v. GAZE=-1-E, Dec. 1, 1883, at 4.
99. Id.
100. It
101. Id. Turner also took occasion to argue against school segregation in Missouri. Turner
suggested that African Americans bring a test case to challenge refusals to admit African-Ameri-
can children to white schools, a practice that ran afoul of Missouri's own law establishing sepa-




African Americans in Norwich convened several meetings to dis-
cuss the Cases and to fix a course of action. 10 2 At a gathering in early
December, those assembled appointed a committee, which subse-
quently issued a call to African Americans across Connecticut to hold
local meetings and send delegates to a state convention in Norwich in
order to consider the "ways and means to secure civil rights for all
citizens regardless of race, color, or previous condition.' 10 3
At the end of December, a state convention of African Ameri-
cans gathered in Norwich to discuss the Court's decision. Although
some of the speakers intoned words of uplift, suggesting to the gather-
ing that they held within themselves the power to command respect,
the body resolved that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
ensure the protection of civil rights.'04 The resolution focused on the
amendment's grant of the rights of citizenship:
That the fourteenth amendment of the constitution confers the right
of citizenship upon all persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. It was the special pur-
pose of this amendment to insure to members of the colored race
the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.10 5
The convention resolved to support any legislation to supplement the
Constitution's guarantees of equal rights and the privileges and immu-
nities of citizenship.1°6
Approximately 150 African-American delegates from across
Ohio gathered in Columbus on December 22, 1883, to consider, gen-
erally, "the educational, moral, civil, and political interests of the
colored race, and particularly the question of the equal rights of the
102. A correspondent to the State Journal of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, reported that the
meetings were addressed "by influential colored men and by leading Republicans, who failed to
inspire confidence that the Republican Party is doing its duty by the race." A Movement for
Civil Rights, STATE J. (Harrisburg, Pa.), Dec. 15, 1883; see also A Movement for Civil Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1883, at 5.
103. A Movement for Civil Rights, STATE J. (Harrisburg, Pa.), Dec. 15, 1883. The State Jour-
nal reported that Walter H. Burr, "a well-known and eloquent colored man" from Norwich, was
the leader of the movement. Id.; see also A Movement for Civil Rights, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 10,
1883, at 5.
104. Insisting on Their Rights: The Colored Citizen's Convention of the State of Connecticut,
STATE J. (Harrisburg, Pa.), Jan. 5, 1884. Speakers included the convention's chairman, Walter H.
Burr of Norwich, Major Delaney of South Carolina, Mr. Claggert of Hartford, and George Jef-
fries of Meriden, whose remarks included the following comment: "The legislature may pass laws
till doomsday telling the people to respect you, but it cannot enforce such laws, for the virtue
within you must command for you respect. The success of civil rights is within you." Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.; see also Insisting on Their Rights: The Colored Citizens' Convention of the State of
Connecticut, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 1883, at 5.
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colored people of the South."107 Participants included a number of
ministers and professional men.1os
B. Additional Comments by the Leadership
In the period immediately following the Court's decision, only
two African Americans remained in Congress, James E. O'Hara, from
North Carolina,1 09 and South Carolinian Robert Smalls." 0 Both
served in the House. O'Hara proposed a constitutional amendment to
lay the foundation that the Court had found lacking in the Cases."'
Recognizing the poor prospects for passage, O'Hara then proposed to
amend a bill concerning interstate commerce by including a require-
ment that interstate passengers be treated without discrimination and
assigned accommodations according to the purchase price of the tick-
ets:112 "[A]ny person or persons having purchased a ticket to be con-
veyed from one State to another, or paid the required fare, shall
receive the same treatment and be afforded equal facilities and ac-
commodations as are furnished all other persons holding tickets of the
same class without discrimination.""13 On the House floor, O'Hara
explained that his amendment would require railroads to provide a
person who purchased a ticket for interstate travel "the same facilities,
privileges, accommodations, and advantages" as other persons holding
the same class of ticket.1 4 O'Hara argued that Congress had not only
107. STATE J., Dec. 29, 1883, reprinted in THE BLACK PRESS, 1827-1890: THE QUEST FOR
NATIONAL IDENTITY 173 (Martin E. Dann ed., 1971) [hereinafter THE BLACK PRESS].
108. Id. at 173. An article appearing in the State Journal of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania one
week later reported: "The recent decision of the Supreme Court annulling the Civil Rights bill,
as well as the murder of colored men at Danville, Virginia, are the principal reasons for the
assembling of the [Ohio] convention .. " Id.
109. James Edward O'Hara, an attorney, won a seat in Congress in the election of 1882, was
reelected to a second term in 1884, and left Congress in 1887 after an electoral defeat. CHISTO-
rI-ER, supra note 95, at 152-56..
110. Robert Smalls, a hero of the Civil War, served a number of terms in Congress. He was
first elected to represent South Carolina's Third District in 1874. Although Smalls was not in
Congress at the time that the Court delivered its decision in the Civil Rights Cases, he was again
elected in 1884, this time to represent the Seventh District, and served until the election of 1886,
when Democratic efforts to disenfranchise African Americans successfully denied Smalls in his
final bid for reelection. Id. at 38-54.
111. H.R. Res. 92, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884) (introduced by Rep. O'Hara and referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary). A number of O'Hara's white colleagues also introduced bills
to address the gap in federal protection left by the Cases. See, e.g., S. 15, 48th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1884); H.R. 2043, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884); H.R. 2694, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884).
112. CHRISTOPHER, supra note 95, at 153-54.
113. 16 CONO. REC. H296-97 (1884).
114. Id. at H297 (emphasis added).
1995]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the power but also an imperative duty to protect citizens from
discrimination. 1
15
Robert Smalls supported O'Hara's proposal and opposed an at-
tempt to attach a provision that would have allowed separate but
equal accommodations. 1 6 In turn, O'Hara criticized the hypocrisy of
those in Congress who opposed congressional protection of civil rights
on the ground that statutes in their home states already outlawed dis-
crimination: "If the gentlemen mean what they say, that it is the idea
and the firm conviction of every man. .. to accord to all men their
rights and privileges," O'Hara suggested, then there would be no need
to attach the rider. 117 He contended, "When gentlemen come here
and say the words 'without discrimination' should be stricken from my
amendment, it shows a deliberate purpose to discriminate.""11
8
Bishop Henry McNeal Turner of the African Methodist Episco-
pal Church discussed the Court's decision during an interview in St.
Louis in late October.119 The Arkansas Mansion reported that Bishop
115. Id. O'Hara cited the many Court decisions upholding congressional authority to regu-
late commerce to support his contention that the Constitution granted Congress the power to
legislate against discrimination in the conduct of interstate commerce ld. O'Hara further ar-
gued that if Congress had the authority to protect and provide for the care of "dumb brutes," or
property being transported by rail, it also held the power to "give voice and expression to the
protection of the rights of American colored citizens." Id. at H297; see also id. at H317.
116. Id. at H316 (statement of Rep. Smalls) (arguing that while African Americans would
not object to riding in separate cars if the cars were of the same character as those provided
whites, congressional sanction of separate accommodations would allow the railroads to con-
tinue providing inferior "Jim Crow" cars and treating African Americans with disrespect); see
also CHRISTOPHER, supra note 95, at 154.
In the aftermath of the Cases, Smalls took a number of other actions to create or reinforce
protections against discrimination. For example, Smalls attempted to attach to a bill a rider that
would have required operators of all eating places in the District of Columbia to provide service
without regard to color. Id. at 49.
117. 16 CONG. REC. H317 (1884).
118. Id. The House approved O'Hara's amendment by a vote of 134 to 97, id. at H297 (vote
on amendment offered by Rep. O'Hara), but weakened and transformed its provisions as it
moved through Congress. See, e.g., id. at 320 (debate over a substitute rider offered by Rep.
Breckinridge). Ultimately, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 forbade the railroads "to make
or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person ... or to
subject any particular persons... to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or any disadvantage of
any respect whatsoever." CHRISTOPHER, supra note 95, at 155. It further established that carri-
ers that charged some passengers higher fares than others for like services would be guilty of
"unjust discrimination." Id.
119. The interview was originally published in the St. Louis Globe-Democrat and was re-
printed in the Arkansas Mansion and the Christian Recorder. RESPECT BLACK, supra note 33, at
60. In 1893 Turner issued The Barbarous Decision of the Supreme Court Declaring the Civil
Rights Act Unconstitutiona4 etc., a pamphlet containing the decision, the dissent and his own
critical remarks about the Cases. Turner reissued the pamphlet with his comments on the
Court's ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 under the title The Black Man's Doom. It at 60.
The Arkansas Mansion described Turner as one of two African Americans, along with Fred-
erick Douglass, who held the implicit confidence of the African-American population. ARK.
MANSION, Nov. 24, 1883, at 1.
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Turner's views on the subject were "very strong" and in "an excitable
tone."'120 When asked, whether, in light of the Supreme Court's ruling
that the Act was unconstitutional, he wanted the government to pro-
tect civil rights in violation of the constitution, Turner answered, "No.
But had the Negro not been involved, it would not have been so un-
constitutional. 1 21 He argued that the postwar amendments had put
the status of African Americans explicitly in the hands of Congress.
The amendments were ratified by the states "with that distinct
understanding."' 22
In comments that presaged defenses of affirmative action pro-
grams a century later, Turner argued, further, that the Court's decision
would leave African Americans in a subordinate position. 123 The con-
tention that the Court's decision simply left African Americans with
the same protections as whites was spurious: "We, of course, object to
this on the ground that as yet things are not even. We are not as
educated as white men; we are not as rich; we are not as strong in
character; we are not as numerous; and altogether we are not as well
prepared to protect ourselves."' 24 Turner analogized African-Ameri-
can requests for legal protection of their rights to industry's desire for
tariffs. "[F]or what is tariff but a protection to a class who confess
themselves not to be as strong as another class?"' 25
In November, Turner outlined his areas of disagreement with the
Court's ruling. 126 First, the decision unsettled and repoliticized the
civil status of African Americans in the United States, a turn of events
that could lead to bloodshed. 27 Next, because the decision rendered
the national government powerless to protect African Americans in
120. Turner on the Civil Rights, ARK. MANSION, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1.
121. Id.
122. Id. Moreover, Turner stated, congressional opponents of the Amendments had specifi-
cally argued that the changes would equalize the white and black races, evidencing their knowl-
edge of the impact these amendments would have. Turner also argued that "any constitution
that does not embody the will of the people ought to be abolished." Id. In stripping the amend-
ments of their meaning, the Supreme Court pit itself, the will of a few men in Washington,
against the popular will, against "every man who voted for Grant or Greely, for both of their
platforms ...." Id.
123. Civil Rights, ARK. MANSION, Dec. 22, 1883, at 1.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Henry McNeal Turner, Open Letter to Prof. B. K. Sampson (Nov. 6, 1883), in RESPECt
BLACK, supra note 33, at 61-62 (reprinted from the Memphis Appeal) (an open letter to B. K.
Sampson chastising Sampson for advocating passivity in the face of the Court's ruling); see also
The Civil Rights Decision: Bishop Turner's Bitter Letter to Prof. B. K. Sampson, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1883, at 5; N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1883, at 4 (unsympathetically reporting on Bishop Tur-
ner's wrath).
127. Turner, supra note 126, at 61-62. Turner argued that the establishment of civil rights
should be distinguished from issues of party politics. "Instead of being a political issue," he
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their freedom, it also destroyed the reciprocal relationship between
the nation and its African-American citizens. The decision, thus, "ab-
solves the allegiance of the negro to the United States. ' 128 Finally,
Turner reiterated his disagreement with the Court's interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment: "The argument that the States have the
right to fix [the African American's] civil status," he argued, "is a
farce., 1
29
At the annual meeting of the Arkansas conference of the Ameri-
can Methodist Episcopal church, held on Nov. 21, Turner, the presid-
ing officer, spoke of the Court's decision in religious terms. Turmer
closed his Bible, grasped a copy of the decision, scanned the document
with an eye of disgust, and, then, "in tones bitter and burning," de-
clared, "that the almighty disposer of all events... who marks with an
undeviating attention and a retributive hand.., the turpitude of those
who profess to govern, will see to it that the oppressors of a poor and
despised people, will in due time have their portion meted out to
them. '1 30 Turner viewed the Civil Rights Cases as pivotal, for the
Court had essentially announced that the national government was
reneging on its pledge to protect the civil rights of African Americans,
and he condemned the decision on numerous occasions. 31
wrote, "[civil rights] involves existence, respect, happiness and all that life is worth." Turner
criticized the Court for allowing politics to interfere with the recognition of rights. Id. at 61.
128. Id. at 62. Turner had first made this point back in October: "[The decision] absolves the
negro's allegiance to the general government, makes the American flag to him a rag of contempt
instead of a symbol of liberty. It reduces the majesty of the nation to an aggregation of ruffian-
ism... and literally unties the devil." Turner on the Civil Rights, ARK. MANSION, Oct. 27, 1883,
at 1.
129. Turner, supra note 126, at 62. Turner argued that it was the national government, not
the states, that had granted citizenship, and was intended to protect the rights of citizenship:
[T]he States did not free the negro, the States (as such, I mean) did not make him a
citizen, the States did not give him the elective franchise ... but the United States did it
all, and now this decision sends us back to the States to get our Civil Rights, for the
white people of the respective States to decide whether we shall be treated as people or
dogs.
Id.
130. A.M.E. Conference: Second Day's Proceedings, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 24, 1883, at 1.
131. See generally RESPECr BLACK, supra note 33, at 60.
The Huntsville Gazette reported that the Civil Rights Cases had made Bishop Tuner into a
"strong secessionist." According to the Gazette, Trner stated, "Any loyal negro should be hung
dead by the neck," a position with which the paper disagreed. ARK. MANSION, Nov. 24, 1883,
(excerpt from Huntsville Gazette). Indeed, in an article published in the A.M.E. Church Review,
Irner offered more strong words about the Court's ruling:
Since the Supreme Court of the United States ... sold out at public auction seven
millions of my race, and wickedly, cruelly and infernally turned us over to the merciless
vengeance of the white rabble of the country, a crime more infamous in its character
than was ever charged upon the devil .... I have given the status of the country very
little consideration politically or otherwise ....
The Democratic Return to Power, A.M.E. CHURCH REV., Jan. 1885, at 246-47 (contribution by
Bishop H.M. Trner, D.D., LL.D., Bishop of the 5th Episcopal District, A.M.E. Church); see
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In 1889, Turner again recapitulated his views in an essay for pub-
lication in the New York Voice.132 He, first, accused the Court of al-
lowing racial prejudice to interfere with its legal judgment. The
images of African Americans intermingling with whites and associat-
ing on equal terms in hotels, theaters, and parlor-cars "completely
blinded the eyes of the [eight], at other times, learned judges," Thrner
asserted.133 Next, he cited with approval passages of Justice Harlan's
dissent criticizing the majority for employing methods of interpreta-
tion that were "too narrow and artificial."' 3
4
Indeed, argued Turner, Congress intended the Civil Rights Act of
1875 to give effect to the Thirteenth Amendment, in part by asserting
that African Americans "shall be treated like other men, in all places
the conduct of which is regulated by law," and that "he shall in no way
be reminded by partial treatment, by discrimination, that he was once
also Henry McNeal Turner, The Force Bill, reprinted in RESPE Cr BLACK, supra note 33, 81-82
(reprinted from CHrISTIAN RECORDER, Aug. 28, 1890) (Turner explains that he left the Republi-
can party after seeing that "it did not intend to remedy that hell-born decision which the
Supreme Court of the United States issued, taking away our civil rights.").
Despite Turner's tone of disgust and alienation, in May 1884, he was working actively in
support of a civil rights bill then before Congress. In an interview with the Baltimore American,
Turner stated that African Americans across the country had been cursing the Supreme Court
Justices since the announcement of the decision. Although Turner stated that he, himself, had
never prayed against the Justices, he had asked God "to reorganize the court as speedily as is
consistent with His will," and he believed that his prayers would be answered. Colored Men of
Mark-Bishops of the A.M.E. Church, N.C. REPUBLICAN, May 22, 1884 (quoting an interview
with the Baltimore American). Turner also discussed at some length the indignities faced by
African Americans traveling by railroad and steamboat and described specific incidents of dis-
crimination. "The railroad companies compel us to buy first-class tickets and then oblige us to
ride in smoking cars[,]" Turner stated, "[and it] matters not how well dressed we are or how
intelligent or refined." Id. See also The Colored Man's Hope-Bishop Turner's Prophecy of a
Nation in Africa-The Present Wrongs and Indignities in the South, STATE J. (Harrisburg, Pa.),
May 17, 1884 (covering the same interview).
132. Turner, supra note 33, at 63. Turner wrote in the essay that since the day of the pro-
nouncement of the Cases, no other civil subject had received more of his study. Id. at 63. In-
deed, the Cases remained on Turner's mind when, in 1893, he addressed the National Council of
Colored Men, a body of more than six hundred delegates that met in Cincinnati in response to
Turner's call. Bishop Henry McNeal Turner, Justice or Emigration Should be our Watchword,
An Address Before the National Council of Colored Men in Cincinnati (Nov. 1893), reprinted in
part in VOICE OF BLACK AMERICA, supra note 95, at 561. Turner began his speech, which fo-
cused on the degradations visited on African Americans and the need for a plan to obtain jus-
tice, with a brief assessment of the position of African Americans in the United States. "We
have been inhabitants of this continent for 273 years," he stated, "and a very limited part of the
time we were citizens-I mean from the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment of the na-
tional Constitution, until the Supreme Court of the United States, October 15, 1883, declared
that provision of the Constitution null and void, and decitizenized us." Id. at 563.
133. Turner, supra note 33, at 66.
134. Id. at 67. Turner devoted a lengthy section of his essay to Harlan's discussion of Consti-
tutional interpretation, focusing, particularly, on Harlan's argument that the Court had departed




a 'chattel,' a 'thing.'" 35 He stated, "[T]he gentlemen in Congress who
voted for [the] act of 1875 understood full well the condition of our
country, as did the powers amending the Constitution abolishing slav-
ery. The intention was to entirely free, not to partly liberate."'1 36 Tur-
ner felt it beyond dispute that the Thirteenth Amendment empowered
Congress to legislate for the eradication of not only the institution of
slavery itself, but also its badges and incidents. 137
Finally, Thrner defended the Civil Rights Act itself. "Was this
law just?" he asked. "Did this law violate the principle which should
be foremost in every hall of legislation-hurt no one, give unto every
man his just due?"'138 In contrast to the Court's decision, which
"doomed seven million human beings and their posterity to 'stalls'
and 'nooks,' denoting inferiority," the Act had "attempted to protect
them from American barbarism and vandalism."'1 39 Although his in-
terpretation of the postwar amendments clearly relied on a belief that
they were intended not just to enact abstract principles of fairness into
law but to enfranchise African Americans, in particular, Turner in-
sisted that his was not a request for favoritism: "I ask no rights and
privileges for my race.., which I would not contend for on behalf of
the white people were the conditions changed, or were I to find pro-
scribed white men in Africa where black rules."'1
40
African-American lawyer and teacher George B. Vashon also
condemned the decision.' 4' The "eight gentlemen of the Supreme
Bench" had overlooked "the spirit of the law" and dabbled with its
wording.142 "They nurse and cherished errors of expression and tram-
ple on the will of the people.' 43 Vashon charged that the Court had
135. Id. at 68.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 68-69. Turner again referred to Harlan's opinion: "Mr. Justice Harlan rightly says
that the Thirteenth Amendment intended that the white race should have no privilege whatso-
ever pertaining to citizenship and freedom .... " Id. at 68.
Turner further argued that limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts to those cases in which
the states passed laws prohibiting African Americans from enjoying particular privileges and
rights was absurd and contravened the authority granted Congress by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. To Turner, the Supreme Court was sanctioning actions that continued to place the badge
of slavery on persons of African descent by saying, "For if they (the Negroes) come to us for
redress, we will talk about the autonomy of the State must be held inviolate, referring them back
to you for satisfaction." I&
138. Id. at 64.
139. Id. at 67.
140. Id. at 69.
141. Geo. B. Vashon, Another View of the Decision Further Legislation Declared Necessary,
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either constrained themselves with technicalities or, worse, had be-
come "the voluntary exponents of a most degraded prejudice."'144 The
Civil Rights Act had been necessary to guarantee civil treatment and
the need for federal protection would continue for as long as racial
majorities and minorities came into contact in the United States.
"[A]s long as there is a possibility of the Negro, the Indian or the
Mongolian coming in contact with the whites of America," Vashon
argued, "there is a necessity for some law, more than the latters' 'wee,
small voice' of conscience, to keep brute force within the bounds of
decency."1 45
Blanche K. Bruce called the decision "unfortunate" and believed
it contrary to "the people's will." 146 "[Ilt is, in my opinion," Bruce
stated, "the revival of Calhoun's theory of State rights."'1 47
Ex-Governor of Louisiana P.B.S. Pinchback added his voice to
those speaking publicly about the Cases. Pinchback argued that even
without the protection of the 1875 Act, the common law protected
civil rights. If denied the privileges of citizenship on account of color,
African Americans at least retained the right to seek redress in state
court.
148
Although former South Carolina Congressman Robert Brown El-
liott initially denounced the Court's action and compared it to the
Dred Scott decision, he subsequently called the judgment a blessing in
disguise. 49 Elliott contended that the lesson to be learned was that
the negro "must strike out boldly for himself, and must rely largely
upon his own efforts to win the confidence and respect of his white
fellow-citizens.' 50 In a statement of upbeat tenor, Elliott suggested
that African Americans would "sweep forward with the advancing
tide of humanity."'' 1 In the South, Elliott stated, the two races "will
in time, learn fully to sympathize with and to respect each other."'1 52
John T. Cook, an African-American collector of taxes, reacted to
the decision with calm. Ultimately, Cook believed, the standing of
African Americans would be measured by their desire for education
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Civil Rights Decision: Views of Leading Colored Men, HuNTSviLE GAZElTE (Ala-
bama), Oct. 20, 1883, at 2.
147. Id.
148. Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1.






and mental culture, and, thus, the decision would have little impact-
"except, perhaps," Cook allowed, "in localities where ignorance
prevails."'1 53
C. Newspaper Coverage
African-American newspapers 154 comprehensively covered the
Supreme Court's decision, and the Cases were the subject of news col-
umns, letters of opinion, and editorials. On October 27, the People's
Advocate, a paper published in the nation's capital, announced that it
was presenting brief extracts of articles about the Court's decision
from other African-American newspapers. "These more than any
other utterances," the Advocate suggested, "reflect colored sentiment
with regard to this last emanation from our court of high resort."' 55
While the papers, their editors, and their columnists attributed varied
significance to the Cases, and differed in their predictions of the deci-
sion's impact, the High Court's action dominated late October and,
for some, November papers.' 56 The papers quoted at length both the
majority opinion and Justice Harlan's dissent. The periodicals also
covered, to varying degrees, speeches and meetings during which the
Cases were discussed. For example, coverage by the New York Globe
included reports on community reactions, 57 statements by John Mer-
cer Langston, 158 George Vashon,' 59 and Republican orator Robert In-
153. Civil Rights Decision: Views of Leading Colored Men, HUNTSVILLE GAZETTE (Ala-
bama), Oct. 20, 1883, at 2.
154. This section is based largely on a review of those African-American newspapers pub-
lished in 1883 that have been preserved on microfilm. The discussion draws most heavily from
the extensive collection of African-American papers contained in the Negro Newspaper Micro-
film Series.
For information on the role played by the black press in communicating information and
advancing both a response to white racism and an assertion of African-American identity, see
THE BLACK PRESS, supra note 107, at 11-23; Bess Beatty, Black Newspapers: Neglected Source
for the "New South", 43 NEGRO HIST. BULL 60 (1980); see also THE BLACK PRESS, supra note
107, at 23-30 (bibliographic sketches of prominent editors).
155. PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 27, 1883. The Advocate stated: "Much
difference of opinion [among the extracts] is manifested; this was to be expected. All, however,
regard it as of no little political importance. Some are despondent; others are hopeful and more
determined to battle for the right." Id.
156. The Huntsville Gazette, and most papers, treated the Cases as the most newsworthy item
of mid-October. In other papers, discussion of the Cases dominated the news sections for
months. The Arkansas Mansion outwardly denied the importance of the case yet devoted a
tremendous proportion of its space to articles related to the Court's decision.
157. See N.Y. GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1883 (reporting, briefly, that in the aftermath of the decision,
500 colored men had taken arms in Austin).
158. The Civil Rights Law: Hon. John Mercer Langston Defines Citizenship and the Rights
Attaching to It, N.Y. GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 2.
159. Geo. B. Vashon, Another View of the Decision: Further Legislation Declared Necessary,
N.Y. GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1883, at 1 (letter to the editor from George B. Vashon).
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gersoll,160 among others,161 and discussions of the impact of the
decision. 162 T. Thomas Fortune, the editor of the New York Globe,
editorialized,163 offered analysis of the Court's opinion, 164 and en-
dorsed the dissent. 65 The Globe quoted from both texts' 66 and
printed correspondence about the decision, 67 including a letter from
the Attorney General,168 although the paper admittedly published
only a fraction of the mail it received on the subject. On November 3,
the Globe reported that its offices had been "flooded" with correspon-
dence on the Cases: "We have really been paralyzed by the abundance
of strong, manly protests and apprehension for the future which has
reached us in the form of correspondence. . . ." The paper asked
forgiveness for its inability to make space for many of the letters. 169
160. The National CapitaL Colonel Ingersoll Delivers Another Eloquent Lecture on the Sub-
ject of Civil Rights-Mr. Evarts on the Decision of the Supreme Court-Odd Fellows' Celebra-
tion-Swindling Pension Attorneys-Personal Notes, N.Y. GLOBE, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1.
Ingersoll's speech was subsequently published, along with introductory remarks by Frederick
Douglass, in pamphlet form. N.Y. GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1883, at 3.
161. See, e.g., N.Y. GLOBE Oct. 20, 1883, at 2 (statement of Algernon S. Sullivan).
162. See, e.g., Civil Rights in New York, N.Y. GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1883, at 2 (stating, "the men
who cater to the popular amusement and accommodation of the public [in New York City] are
making a decided effort to abridge the rights and immunities of citizens of this State on the
strength of the recent decision of the Supreme Court"). In light of the Court's decision and its
immediate impact-i.e., emboldening those who would discriminate against African Americans
and discouraging African Americans from seeking redress for such insults-Fortune devoted his
editorial column on December 29 to the publication and discussion of New York State's civil
rights law, "An Act to Provide for the Protection of Citizens in Their Civil and Public Rights."
it Fortune reminded readers that though the Court had denied Congress the power to protect
civil rights, the decision "did not deny that citizens of the United States were not each and
severally entitled to enjoy the same civil and political rights." Id. While Fortune condemned the
Court for remanding the protection of the rights of citizenship to the states, he believed that
African Americans should seek recourse in the courts of the State of New York, a state that held
the citizen liable for "infractions upon private rights and vested rights." Id.
163. See, e.g., Fortune, supra note 1; Between Two Fires, N.Y. GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 2; Mr.
Justice Harlan's Opinion of Civil Rights, N.Y. GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1883, at 2.
164. See Fortune, supra note 1, at 315; Between Two Fires, N.Y. GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 2;
Civil Rights in New York, N.Y. GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1883, at 2.
165. See Mr. Justice Harlan's Opinion of Civil Rights, N.Y. GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1883, at 2.
166. The Civil Rights Bill: The Supreme Court Declares its Two Principal Sections Unconstitu-
tional, N.Y. GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1883, at 2; The National Capital: The Able and Exhaustive Opinion
of Mr. Justice Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases-The Authors' Carnival-Dr. Grimke's Sermon
on Luther-Col. Ingersoll on The Glob-Official and Personal Intelligence, N.Y. GLOBE, Nov.
24, 1883, at 1.
167. See, e.g., America's Degradation: The Impotency of the Government to Protect its Citi-
zens at Home, N.Y. GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1883, at 2 (letter from "Republican"); John W. Ewing, The
Words of Sumner: Equality Not Found in Equivilants, N.Y. GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1883, at 1 (letter to
the editor in which Ewing argues, in the wake of the Civil Rights Cases, against acceptance of
proposals for separate but equal accommodations); J. D. Powell, Jr., N.Y. GLOBE, Oct. 27; 1883,
at 3.
168. The Rights of Negroes: A Letter from Attorney-General Brewster-The Only Remedy for
Grievance-A Reply from an Advocate of Separation, N.Y. GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1.
169. N.Y. GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1883, at 2.
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Other papers also devoted significant amounts of space and edi-
torial attention to the Cases. The Cleveland Gazette, a paper devoted
to "education, equality and progression," ran articles relating to the
Court's decision throughout the fall of 1883.170 Among the ex-
cerpts,171 editorials, 172 and reports printed by the Gazette173 were sto-
ries about meetings called by African Americans in the region to
170. See CLEV. GAZETE, Oct. 20, 1883, Oct. 27, 1883, Nov. 3, 1883, Nov. 10, 1883, Nov. 24,
1883, Dec. 1, 1883, Dec. 8, 1883, Dec. 15, 1883, Jan. 5, 1884.
171. Civil Rights Law: Declared Unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, CLEv. GAZETTE,
Oct. 20, 1883, at 2.
172. Id.; CLEv. GAZET=E, Nov. 17, 1883, at 2 (responding to a Pittsburgh Chronicle editorial
advising patience); see also Our Washington Letter: Judge Mills' Decision in a Civil Rights Case-
The National Convention-Personals, CLEv. GAzETrE, Aug. 25, 1883, at 1 (containing an edito-
rial on a lower court decision in an earlier test of the Civil Rights Act).
173. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Bill: An Indignant Citizen Expresses His Views on the Repeal
of this Famous Bill, CLEV. GAZEl-rE, Oct. 20, 1883, at 2 (letter to the editor signed from B); Civil
Rights Decision-An Immense Mass Meeting of the Colored Citizens and Their Friends at Lin-
coln Hall CLEv. GAZETTE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1; Civil Rights Decision: Colonel Robert G. Inger-
soll's Speech in Lincoln Hall, Washington, D.C., OcL 22, CLEv. GAZETTE, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1
(lengthy excerpt from Colonel Ingersoll's address); Discrimination, CLv. GAZETTE, Nov. 10,
1883, at 2 (reporting, "E.F. Brown .... editor of the Indianapolis World, has sued an Indianapo-
lis man for $5,000 damages for ejecting him from a restaurant" and suggesting, "Now we will see
how common law regards the Negro."); Gleanings from Columbus: Political-Civil Rights-Soci-
ety Gossip-A Marriage, CLEV. GAZETrE, Oct. 20, 1883, at 2 (reporting that the decision had
created "considerable interest among our colored brothers"); Hon. John P. Green, Civil Rights:
Deep Game Being Played by Arthur Politicians-What Next?, CLEv. GAZET'E, Oct. 20, 1883, at
2; The National Capital-Civil Rights, Ct.v. GAZE=rE, Dec. 15, 1883, at 1 (discussing congres-
sional action proposed in response to the Cases, including a resolution authorizing a constitu-
tional amendment and a bill offered by African-American Congressman James E. O'Hara);
Notes and Comments, CLEv. GAZETrE, Nov. 10, 1883, at 2 (covering a "large meeting of promi-
nent colored citizens held at Memphis, Tenn.," during which addresses were made and resolu-
tions adopted "expressive of a desire to secure the State enactment of the Civil Rights bill");
Pittsburgh: Civil Rights Discussed, CLEv. GAZETTE, Jan. 5, 1884, at 1 (comparing oppression of
African Americans in the United States with British tyranny over Ireland and arguing that his-
tory teaches both countries "that the security and strength of a government depends upon the
just and equal protection it affords each and every one of its subjects"); That Supreme Court,
CLaV. GAZETTE, Nov. 10, 1883, at 2; Wilburforce: Civil Rights Ably Discussed by Prof. B.F Lee
and Our Able Correspondent-Personals, CLEV. GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 1883, at 2 (arguing that
neither court decisions nor the neglect of political parties could crush the manhood implanted in
each individual and reporting on B.F. Lee's opinion that the Act was constitutional and the
Court's decision unjust and illegal); Xenia-Numerous Notes-Politics-Civil Rights, CLEv. GA-
ZE-rE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 2; CLEv. GAZETrE, Oct. 20, 1883, at 2 (report on a meeting to be held in
Washington and short comments on the Cases); CLEv. GAZETrE, Oct. 27, 1883 (including ex-
cerpts from the Harrisburg State Journal and the News, and brief comments by or about Colonel
Robert G. Ingersoll, John Mercer Langston, Justice Harlan, the impact of the decision on the
policies of hotel-keepers and railroads, indignation meetings, and the Supreme Court); CLEv.
GAznrr, Nov. 3, 1883 (excerpts from the Columbus Dispatch and the Press), at 2.
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discuss the Cases174 and coverage of the erosion of civil rights that
followed in the wake of the decision.
175
A column presenting the views of John P. Green, an African-
American legislator in Ohio, appeared in the Cleveland Gazette's first
issue covering the decision. Green warned the readership of the po-
tential impact of a Court willing to use its power to prejudice and
jeopardize the interests of African Americans. 76 Green first dis-
cussed the limited power of the law. In the South, Green argued, the
Act had had little practical effect because whites simply disregarded
its terms. While African Americans fared better in the North, Green
suggested, improved treatment may have occurred anyway, without
the benefit of a law on the subject. In sum, where prevailing senti-
ment allowed the enforcement of a civil rights law, the existence of the
law was likely unnecessary.
177
Nevertheless, Green viewed the Court's decision with apprehen-
sion. While the practical effect of declaring the Civil Rights Act un-
constitutional might be circumscribed, the ruling stood as precedent.
Green proposed that the Court had essentially announced itself ready
to interfere with the legal status of the former slave population: "Will
not the next question be raised under the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
amendments? And is it not barely possible that the next decision will
be that [other protections] are unconstitutional and void?"'178
Green speculated that party politics supplied the underlying mo-
tive for the Court's reversion to the doctrine of states' rights and
174. CLEV. GAZErTE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 2 ("Indignation meetings have been held in Indianap-
olis, Cincinnati, Columbus, Springfield, Washington and numerous other places the past week.");
John W. Anderson, et al., Pittsburgh. Personals-A Civil Rights Mass Meeting-Politics, CLEv.
GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 1883, at 1 (reporting that "[a] large meeting of the colored citizens of the two
cities was held at Franklin Street School-house on last Thursday evening for the purpose of
denouncing the recent decision," that the speakers included prominent men such as "Barks,
Smith, Johnson, Jones, Carson, and Delphey," and that the discussion included arguments
against discrimination and for the Republican Party); Civil Rights-The Harmonious and Enthu-
siastic Mass Meeting at Halcyon Hall Last Monday Evening, CLEv. GAZETrE, Nov. 3, 1883, at 2;
A Mass Meeting, CLEv. GAZETE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 2; Our Western Letter-Civil Rights Mass
Meeting of St. Louis Colored Citizens, at Which Hon. J. Milton Turner Orates, CLEV. GAZETrE,
Dec. 1, 1883, at 4; State Capital-Gleanings From Columbus-The Supreme Court's Decision
Still the Leading Topic-Colored Men Call a Meeting, CLEv. GAZETrE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1.
175. See, e.g., Railroads in Texas Take Advantage of That Outrageous Decision, CLEV. GA-
zEairE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 2. The Gazette also reported on public accommodations that announced
that they would continue to serve African Americans. See CLEv. GAZETIE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 2
(reporting on decisions by hotel-keepers in Forest City, as well as the policy of the American
House, to which the paper answered, "Bravo!").
176. Hon. John P. Green, Civil Rights: Deep Game Being Played by Arthur Politicians-What





abandonment of one of the very features that had most distinguished
the Republican party. Green credited the Republicans with constru-
ing the Constitution "as being sufficiently broad and elastic to save the
Union and guarantee to every citizen his rights of citizenship."'' 79
Under this construction, Green argued, it had become possible to
raise, equip, and send off armies, to issue greenback currency, and to
reconstruct the states. With the Civil Rights Cases, however, the Re-
publican Court now lapsed into the Democratic position, that such
acts were unwarranted by the Constitution.180
John W. Anderson, J.C. Delphey, and Joseph Evans submitted
the Cleveland Gazette's "Pittsburgh" column. The authors disparaged
those debating the legality of the Court's decision in narrow, technical
terms:
[O]ur mind is not walled up by Kent, our judgment bound by legal
technicalities, nor our heart petrified by Blackstone. We may not be
able to trace that imaginary line where the lex scripta of constitu-
tional power and the lex non scripta of what is right and just, blend
and harmonize, but we do know what is right and what is wrong. 181
179. Id.
180. Id. A letter to the editor signed B. appeared next to the views of John P. Green and
expressed similar sentiments. B., The Civil Rights Bilk An Indignant Citizen Expresses His View
on the Repeal of this Famous Bill, CLEV. GAZErE, Oct. 20, at 2. B expressed outrage and indig-
nation, calling the Court's judgment "one of the greatest outrages that ever came from the
Supreme bench," and declaring it "worse than the Dred Scott decision." Id. B believed that the
Court's conclusions were the consequence of bias, rather than deliberation. The Court had de-
fied the principles of Abraham Lincoln, Garrison, Sumner, Grant, and Sherman, and, instead,
had bowed to Calhoun and the Confederates. Id.
B argued, further, that whereas judicial interpretation should be true to the letter and spirit
of the law, the Court's decision conflicted with the terms and intent of the amendments: "[T]he
constitution ought to be sustained and mean just what it says. If it says justice and equality to all
American citizens it should mean that, and if it is intended as a protection, by it we expected to
be protected ...." B advocated a constitutional amendment to place congressional authority to
protect civil rights beyond the reach of "biased Judges and traitors." Id.
Green again spoke of the Civil Rights Cases during an address to a national convention of
African Americans held in Pittsburgh in May 1884. John P. Green, These Evils Call Loudly for
Redress, An Address Before Delegates to a Pittsburgh Convention Examining the Problems of
Black America (May 1884), reprinted in part in VoicE oF BLACK AMERICA, supra note 95, at
499. Green elaborated on the difference between claims for social equality, which could not be
realized through legislation, and civil rights, which were subject to legal enactment. "[T]he worst
phase of... iniquity does not consist in the fact that the colored American is, at home, a social
pariah, whose very touch is shunned," he stated, referring to the ubiquitous effects of social
prejudice. Id. at 502. "[I]t lies deeper than this, and becomes oppressive," he continued, "when
met in the commercial world, obstructing our progress and keeping us poor." Id. In the latter
case, prejudice intervened to rob African Americans of civil rights. Paradoxically, stated Green,
not only were African Americans subject to the deleterious effects of social prejudice, but, as a
result of the Cases, Congress lacked the authority to legislate protection for civil rights as well.
Id. at 503.
181. John W. Anderson et al., Pittsburgh. A Strong Civil Rights Argument from the Keystone
State-The Atlanta Constitution Roughly Handled, CLEv. GAzErrE, Nov. 24, 1883, at 2.
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"It does not require law books," the writers continued, "to satisfy the
intelligent mind as to what is just and what is unjust."'1 82 And by any
reckoning, the Court's ruling that the Civil Rights of Act of 1875 was
unconstitutional was unjust.
183
The true test of the Act's goodness, the Pittsburgh correspon-
dents argued, flowed from its effects. The Act protected African
Americans from "the prejudice of the hour," and never operated to
the detriment of others.' 84 In contrast, the Court's decision "lets loose
the dogs of cruel prejudice to prey upon a long suffering and perse-
cuted people. It is a decision which no sophistry can palliate, no rea-
son justify."' 8 5 Similarly, the authors criticized the idea, proposed in
defense of the decision, that the basic rights of citizenship established
by constitutional amendment remained intact, for its emptiness, or
lack of practical consequence:
What is the practical value of these legislative enactments if there is
no executive force behind them, no penalty attached to their viola-
tion? What good or use are our rights of citizenship as long as there
is a cruel and wicked prejudice standing between us and the enjoy-
ment of them. These constitutional amendments "availeth me noth-
ing .. ."186
The establishment of a right was meaningless, they argued, unless the
right could be enforced.
The Pittsburgh correspondents argued that it is the object of gov-
ernment to protect citizens' rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. Otherwise, in accordance with the dictates of humanity
and the Declaration of Independence, the government is a failure.187
The Huntsville (Alabama) Gazette, while somewhat less vocifer-
ous in tone than the Globe and the Cleveland Gazette, also covered




185. Id. Presaging the rationale for judicial protection of minority rights expounded nearly a
century later, the authors wrote, "You cannot with impunity tramp upon the rights of the few."
Id. The authors' argument for the protection of the rights of African Americans was based not
only on a concern for protection of minorities, generally, but also on the belief that African
Americans, in particular, were making demands commensurate with their right: African Ameri-
cans were, after all, asking the government to protect "those who stood by it and defended it in
the dark days of the rebellion." Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Edited by Charles Hendley Jr., the Huntsville Gazette covered local and national news,
issues of science and industry, and local events, including robberies, deaths, and meetings.
The Cases received front page coverage on Oct. 20, 1883. The Civil Rights Act: The United
States Supreme Court Declares the Act Unconstitutional, Justice Harlan Alone Dissenting-The
Law Reviewed, HUNTSVILLE GAZETrE (Alabama), Oct. 20, 1883, at 1.
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on the case and the dissent and printed portions of both the Act and
the decision. 189 The Gazette's Mobile correspondent, whose byline
read "Onus," devoted his November 3 column in large part to discus-
sion of the Cases. Onus wrote, "Since my last letter the mind of the
Nation has been disturbed in consequence of a judicial injury inflicted
upon the colored race. . "..",190 According to the column, although the
Act had had little practical consequence, in view of the difficulty of
obtaining judgments in the inferior courts, nevertheless its terms had
symbolic value and provided for oversight by courts that were re-
moved from local prejudices. The Act had given African Americans a
"feeling of satisfaction," that even if suits were unsuccessful, "there
was a court of last resort that would give consideration to the inten-
tion as well as the letter of the law."'191
Additional coverage in the Gazette included reports on Frederick
Douglass's views about the Cases,'92 and, among other letters and re-
ports about the subject, 193 articles about a Birmingham meeting called
to discuss the decision' 94 and a series of resolutions passed by Bir-
mingham citizens.'9 5
The People's Advocate, a newspaper published weekly in Wash-
ington, D.C., and filled with snippets of scientific information, medical
advice, poems, historical stories, and other items of interest, also de-
voted considerable attention to the case.196 The Advocate printed re-
189. Id.; The Civil Rights Decision: Text of the Dissenting Opinion as Delivered by Justice
Harlan, HUNTSVILLE GAzErE (Alabama), Nov. 24, 1883, at 2.
190. Onus, Mobile: The Civil Rights Decision. Business Looking Up. Other Notes of Interest,
HUNTSVILLE GAZErrE (Alabama), Nov. 3, 1883, at 3.
191. Id.
192. Civil Rights Decision: Views of Leading Colored Men, HuNrsvILE GAZETTE (Ala-
bama), Oct. 20, 1883, at 2.
193. See, e.g., Civil Rights Decision: Views of Leading Colored Men, HUNTSVILLE GAZETTE
(Alabama), Oct. 20, 1883, at 2 (containing initial reactions by ex-Senator Bruce, John T. Cook,
ex-Senator Lyman Trumbell, and Frederick Douglass); News and Notes, HUNTSVILLE GAZETTE
(Alabama), Nov. 3, 1883, at 3 (excerpts from coverage by the Chattanooga Times, Montgomery
Advertiser, the World). In its December 8 coverage of a speech by President Arthur, the paper
added the comment, "In view of the recent Civil Rights Decision and consequent events and
discussion his manly words in behalf of Civil Rights for the colored citizens will endear him to
the whole race." President Arthur's Message, HUNTSVILLE GAZETE (Alabama), Dec. 8, 1883, at
2.
194. State News, HUNTSVILLE GAZETTE (Alabama), Nov. 10, 1883, at 2. Relying on informa-
tion published by the Birmingham Age, the Gazette reported that a large number of representa-
tive African Americans had met in Birmingham to express the sentiments of African Americans
on the Act and the Court's decision. According to this version of events, resolutions were
passed denouncing both the decision and the Act itself, the latter "as a deception to the colored
people." Id.
195. Colored Citizens of Birmingham on the Civil Rights Decision, HUNTSVILLE GAZETTE
(Alabama), Nov. 17, 1883, at 2.
196. See, e.g., PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 20, 1883, Oct. 27, 1883, Nov. 3,
1883, Nov. 10, 1883, Nov. 17, 1883, Nov. 24, 1883. Under the direction of C.A. Lemar, its busi-
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ports, letters, analyses, and excerpts of the decision. 197 Coverage
included a column under the byline "Le Duke," for example, which
focused primarily on the consequences of the decision, that is, "[t]he
humiliations, the mental agony, the actual deprivation, the galling,
burning and unjustifiable insults" African Americans in the District of
Columbia and across the South receive at the hands of the prejudiced
and revengeful. 198 While technically the decision may have been in
accordance with law, the columnist argued, the Court should have
taken account of the consequences of its action. 199 "The rules of con-
struction were ample enough to have accepted the law constitutional
upon the ground of manifest intent," Le Duke contended.20
0
ness manager and financial agent, the People's Advocate was less overtly political than Fortune's
New York Globe or Smith's Gazette.
197. PEoPLE's ADVOCATE, Oct. 20, 1883, at 2 (praising Justice Harlan); PEOPLE's ADVO-
CATE, Oct. 20, 1883, at 2 (praising Bob Ingersoll for speaking out); PEoPLE's ADVOCATE, Oct.
27, 1883, at 1-2 (reporting on a convention in Illinois, which produced resolutions regarding the
decision, commenting on Robert Ingersoll's speech, a paper given by G.H. Richardson at a liter-
ary society, and the meeting at Lincoln Hall addressed by Frederick Douglass, and excerpting
from the Echo, Standard, Mobile Gazette, Virginia Star, American Citizen of New Orleans, La.,
and Huntsville Gazette); PEOPLE's ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 3, 1883, at 2 (comment-
ing on the decision, generally, the reaction to the Cases by the International Railroad of Texas
and the responsibility of Northern capitalists, and the abdication of responsibility by the Repub-
lican party, among other related topics); Argus, Stand by the Party, PEoPLE's ADVOCATE (Wash-
ington, D.C.), Nov. 3, 1883, at 1; Bethel Literary, PEoPLE's ADVOCATE, Oct. 20, 1883, at 2
(reporting that a paper on the ruling would be read at a literary meeting); Bethel Literary: What
Shall We Do?, PEoPLE's ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 17, 1883, at 2; The Civil Rights
Decision, PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 20, 1883 (reporting on the effect of the
decision on national politics); The Civil Rights Decision-The Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlan, PEoPLE's ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 24, 1883, at 2 (lengthy description of and
excerpts from the dissent); The Decision, PEoPLE's ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 20,
1883, at 2 (description of and excerpts from both the Act and the Court's decision); Rev. J. C.
Embry, The Exigent Duty, PEOPLE's ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 15, 1883, at 2 (letter
to the editor, expressing the view that although whites repudiate their covenant with African
Americans in sentiment and practice, escape from the United States is not a practical solution);
I. B. B., Our Nebraska Letter, PEoPLE's ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 17, 1883, at 2; Le
Duke, Bob Ingersoll, PEoPLE's ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 10, 1883, at 1; Le Duke,
Make Yourselves Independent, PEoPLE's ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 3, 1883, at 1;
Some Corrections, PEoPLE's ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 27, 1883, at 2.
198. Le Duke, Civil Rights, PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 27, 1883, at 1.
199. If, having considered the effect of removing legal restraints upon evil, members of the
Court had still been inclined to declare the Act unconstitutional, Le Duke wrote, "they merit the
condemnation of all christendom." Id.
200. Id. The column argued, further, that African Americans had earned the protections due
citizens. Le Duke asked, rhetorically, why the Court had refused to shield African Americans
from scorn and prejudice: "Is it because we have shed no blood in defense of our country? Are
we waiting in fidelity?" Id. To the contrary, Le Duke wrote, African Americans had developed




Coverage by the Arkansas Mansion20' was lengthy and included
reports on and segments from the decision and the dissent,20 2 editorial
analyses,203 the statements of leaders such as Henry McNeal Tur-
ner,2° and paragraphs from news articles which had appeared in other
papers across the country.20 5 The Mansion printed a letter from At-
torney General Brewster,206 as well as a report that railroads could
legally impose segregation in accordance with the Court's action,20 7
the comments of African-American lawyer J.D. Lewis,20 8 a compari-
201. The Mansion, a newspaper devoted to self-help and temperance, generally printed arti-
cles on local, national, and international news, in addition to announcements, advertisements,
and information relating to the temperance movement. The editorial position of the paper was
solidly Republican and often critical of Globe editor T. Thomas Fortune, the editor of the Savan-
nah Echo, and others who vacillated in their support for the Republican party.
202. Civil Rights: Important Decision by the United States Supreme Court-The Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments Defined as to the Rights of Colored People, ARK. MANSION, Oct. 20,
1883, at 1 (containing a report on and summary of the Court's decision, as well as Justice
Harlan's dissent; and the text of the first two sections of the Act); Our Civil Rights Held Invio-
late, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 3, 1883, at 1; Our Opinion of Justice Harlan's Views, ARK. MANSION,
Dec. 1, 1883, at 1.
203. See Equal Rights, ARK. MANSION, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1; see also Equal Rights, ARK. MAN-
SION, Nov. 3, 1883, at 1; Equal Rights, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883; Equal Rights, ARK. MAN-
SION, Nov. 17, 1883, at 1; Equal Rights, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 24, 1883, at 1; Our Opinion of
Justice Harlan's Views, ARK. MANSION, Dec. 1, 1883, at 1.
204. Turner on the Civil Rights, ARK. MANSION, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1; ARK. MANSION, Dec. 22,
1883, at 1.
205. ARK. MANSION, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1 (excerpt from the Louisville Commercial, stating that
the Court's decision afforded the Democratic party the opportunity to prove itself to African
Americans by passing state civil rights bills); Civil Rights, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1
(excerpts from the Globe Democrat, Cincinnati Afro-American, Defiance (Athens, Georgia));
Civil Rights-Opinions of the Press, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 3, 1883, at 1 (excerpts from the Ar-
kansas Gazette, Arkansas Democrat, New York Globe, the Boston Hub, Indianapolis Leader
Gate City Press, People's Advocate, Springfield Review (Ohio), Louisville Bulletin, Kentucky Re-
publican, New Orleans American Citizen, Detroit Plaindealer, Chicago Conservator, Cincinnati
Afro-American); Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1 (ex-
cerpts from the Southwestern Christian Advocate, Brinkley Argus, New York Tribune, Philadel-
phia Times, Arkansas Methodist); Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 17,
1883, at 1 (excerpts from the Loneke Democrat, Chattanooga Colored American, Hot Springs
Sentinel, Arkansas Dispatch, Galveston News, New York World, Paris Laborer (Texas), Savannah
Echo, Florida News, and the World (Indianapolis)).
206. The Rights of Negroes: A Letter from Attorney-General Brewster-The Only Remedy for
Grievance, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 3, 1883, at 1. Brewster's letter responded to correspondence
from J.W. Niles, an Arkansan advocate of racial separation. Niles had detailed grievances of the
African American population, including efforts by the state to prevent African Americans from
purchasing public lands, oppressive fines, and cruel punishments inflicted upon trifling pretexts.
The Attorney General expressed sympathy for the plight of the African-American citizens of
Arkansas and suggested that, indeed, the impediments under which they labored violated the
United States Constitution. Nevertheless, the United States had no power to interfere to pro-
vide relief. Neither did the United States Congress have power to legislate on these subjects.
"The remedy has been placed by [the] constitution in your own hands-i.e., by appeal from the
judgments of the state courts to the supreme court of the United States." Id.
207. ARK. MANSION, Nov. 3, 1883, at 1.
208. Civil Rights, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1.
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son of Dred Scott and the Civil Rights Cases,209 and a variety of other
reports, letters, and opinions.210
These newspaper reports suggest that discussions of the Civil
Rights Cases among African Americans continued well after much of
the nation had turned to other matters. Legislative, judicial, and polit-
ical activities within African-American communities that followed in
the wake of the Court's decision also continued. The Court's decision
remained on the agenda, for example, when the Colored National Ex-
ecutive Committee met in Louisville on December 20, 1883. The
Colored National Executive Committee was a group of African-
American leaders that included ex-Governor P.B.S. Pinchback, then
serving as surveyor of the Port of New Orleans; A.M. Dumond, a na-
val officer in the Port of New Orleans; Col. W. Pledger, collector of
Customs in Atlanta, Georgia; historian George W. Williams of Massa-
chusetts; and Judge George L. Ruffin of Massachusetts. Frederick
Douglass joined the meeting and specifically suggested that the Com-
mittee endorse Justice Harlan's opinion.21'
209. ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1.
210. Coverage included, for example, a report from Galveston, Texas concerning a decision
by the International Railroad to neither treat African Americans as equals nor establish separate
coaches. A company spokesman stated that, instead, the railroad could now make African
Americans take whatever seats the railroad desired. The Color Line Railroads, ARK. MANSION,
Nov. 3, 1883, at 1; see also ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1 (excerpt from Florida News,
reporting on the reaction of Hon. Thomas V. Gibbs); ApR. MANSION, Nov. 17, 1883, at 1 (report
on an interview with Colonel Robert Ingersoll and letters concerning the need for civil rights
legislation in Arkansas); Address to the Colored People of Louisville, ARK. MANSION, Oct. 27,
1883, at 1 (reporting on the gathering in Louisville, Kentucky); I.B. Atkinson, ARK. MANSION,
Nov. 10, 1883 (letter to the editor agreeing with the Mansion's editorial position); Bob Ingersoll,
on Justice Harlan's Dissenting Opinion, ARK. MANSION, Dec. 8, 1883, at 1; Civil Rights, ARK.
MAr sIoN, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1 (reporting on civil rights laws in Arkansas and Kentucky); Civil
Rights, ARK. MANSION, Dec. 22, 1883, at 1 (coverage of a letter written by Bishop Turner on the
subject of the decision); Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1
(excerpts include statements by John Mercer Langston, Colonel A. J. Dumont, P.B.S. Pinchback,
and Colonel James Lewis); Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 17, 1883, at
1 (excerpts include statements by J.S. Hinton and Georgia Senator Brown, who announced that,
as head of the Georgia railroad syndicate, he would enforce a policy of segregation, South Caro-
lina Senator Wade Hampton and the "ultra ex-rebel" from Georgia, Hamburg Butler); The
Colored People of Kansas, ARK. MANSION, Dec. 22, 1883, at 1 (reporting on resolutions adopted
by a meeting of African Americans in Kansas for presentation to Congress); Col. W.A. Pledger,
of Ga.-His Answer to an Afro-American Reporter-On the Civil Rights Bill, ARK. MANSION,
Dec. 1, 1883, at 1; A Texan's Opinion of the Effect Civil Rights Will Have, ARK. MANSION, Dec.
15, 1883, at 1 (letter from Alfred Scott, an African American who served in the Louisiana legisla-
ture, declining comment on the "abstract ideas" governing the Court's reasoning, but arguing
that the decision would have the effect of eliminating the "bug-bear of social equality" from
political debate and fraternization between the races in the South); Washington Letter, ARK.
MANSION, Dec. 1, 1883, at 1.
211. Louisville National Executive Committee, STATE J. (Harrisburg, Pa.), Dec. 29, 1883 (ex-
cerpt from the Vindicator).
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Moreover, despite the unavailability of remedies once offered by
the Civil Rights Act, African Americans continued to pursue their
claims in federal forums212 as well as state courts.213 In March 1885,
the New York Freeman reported that "colored citizens are thoroughly
alive to the importance of obtaining their civil rights. ' 214 According
to the report, African Americans had "an almost breathless interest"
in a case before a local court that had been brought against the man-
agers of a skating rink.215 African Americans had recently met to ex-
press indignation at violations of civil rights, and had appointed a
committee to carry out a series of resolutions. The committee, in turn,
had appeared before a legislative committee and presented a draft bill
to protect civil rights.216
African Americans in a number of states agitated for new state
legislation to protect civil rights or, where civil rights laws were al-
ready on the books, argued against their repeal.217 In addition, the
African-American press continued to report on and press for Con-
gressional efforts to circumvent the High Court's ruling.218
African-American newspapers also continued to cover specific in-
cidents of discrimination, creating a record of some of the many indig-
nities suffered by African Americans, the very types of insults that the
Act had been intended to prohibit.219 Most papers did not assume
212. In June 1887, for example, the Western Cyclone, edited and published by George S.
Sanford in Nicodemus, Kansas, reported on the status of complaints filed with the Inter-State
Commission, which regulated the railroads. The Inter-state Commission: A Colored Man's Com-
plaint of Discrimination, W. CYCLONE, June 10, 1887. One complainant, William H. Council,
claimed that he had been forcibly ejected from a first-class car after having paid for a first-class
ticket, and requested an award of $25,000 damages and such other relief as the Commission
might deem proper. The Commission ordered the Georgia Central Railroad to answer Council's
complaint. The defendants in two other cases, the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad and
the Union Pacific Railroad, had recently filed answers, both denying the Commission's jurisdic-
tion to grant relief. Id.
213. See, e.g., No Violation of Civil Rights, VA. STAR, Sept. 21, 1994 (reporting on the ruling
of Bloomington, Illinois Circuit Court Judge lipton, in a case brought by African Americans
who were refused soda water at a soda fountain, that the state public accommodations law "did
not apply to a druggist or any one keeping a soda fountain," and that such businesses "might
choose the persons with whom they wished to do business .....
214. N.Y. FREEMAN, Mar. 7, 1885.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., STATE J. (Harrisburg, Pa.), Dec. 15, 1883 (reprinting an article that originally
appeared in the Charleston, South Carolina News and Courier that advised members of state
legislature against repeal of stringent state law).
218. See, e.g., STATE J. (Harrisburg, Pa.), Dec. 15, 1883.
219. See, e.g., The Color Line in the South, STATE J. (Harrisburg, Pa.), Jan. 19, 1884 (excerpt
from the Harlem Sentinel concerning, first, three African Americans who were compelled to
move to a second class rail car, despite having paid full fare, and, second, an African American
couple ejected from a place of entertainment in West Point, despite the woman's white
appearance).
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that, with the ruling in the Civil Rights Cases, these incidents were no
longer newsworthy.22 0
D. Editorials
T. Thomas Fortune reflected on the hollow promises offered by
the law and the hypocrisy of the Court's decision: In what position did
the Civil Rights Cases leave African Americans? He answered,
Simply this-we have the ballot without any law to protect us in the
enjoyment of it; we are declared to be created equal, and entitled to
certain rights, among them life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,
but there is not law to protect us in the enjoyment of them.... We
are placed at the mercy of every lawless ruffian; we are declared to
be the victims of infamous injustice without redress .... 21
Fortune argued that the decision was both incorrect and unjust.
Harkening back to the Declaration of Independence, his writing indi-
cated an underlying belief that, where rights were guaranteed, they
should be enforceable. Twice in his initial editorial on the Cases For-
tune cited the wording of the Declaration and found intolerable Court
declarations that the government is powerless to protect its citizens in
"the enjoyment of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Refer-
ring to the Court's decisions in both the Civil Rights Cases and United
States v. Harris,222 in which the Court held the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871 unconstitutional, Fortune asked, "What sort of Government is
that which openly declares it has no power to protect its citizens from
ruffianism, intimidation and murder! Is such a Government worthy of
220. See, e.g., Race Separation-Attempt to Keep Children Apart in the Schools, W. CY-
CLONE, July 29, 1887 (reporting on the introduction of a bill in the Georgia legislature to make it
a penal offense to educate white and African American children in the same schools, which the
paper argued would be contrary to a clause in the state constitution); BAPTIST HEADLIoirr, Oct.
15, 1893 (reporting, "The long talked of jim-crow separate coach bill of the State of Kentucky
went into effect the 1st day of October, and the editor of this paper had the pleasure of riding in
one of the noted Negro coaches three days before it went into effect ... ").
221. Fortune, supra note 1, at 315, 316. Earlier in the same year, Fortune had made a similar
argument:
We fully understand the law of the United States-we know that it has the power to
make citizens, and we know that it has no power to protect them. Thus the Negroes of
the South were made citizens of the United States, but the states say they shall not
enjoy the privileges of citizenship and the National Government has shown in a thou-
sand instances that it had no power to coerce the states.... [Non-interference by the
federal government is] based upon the powers vested in the federal government and
those reserved to the states .... While the tyranny which has always flowed from
centralized government is obviated, no check is placed upon the tyranny of the individ-
ual state....
N.Y. GLOBE, Feb. 17, 1883, reprinted in Tim BLACK PREss, supra note 107, at 173, 174. Fortune
argued that "governments are maintained for the protection of life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness of its members," and that the federal government must have the power to guarantee
such protection. Id.
222. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
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the respect and loyalty of honest men?" Fortune argued that in de-
claring that African Americans have no civil rights and that mistreat-
ment and exclusion are permissible, that the Court "has reaffirmed
the infamous decision of the infamous Chief Justice Taney that a
'black man has no rights that a white man is bound to respect.'"223
A little more than a month later, Fortune devoted another edito-
rial to the Cases. Fortune applauded Justice Harlan's dissent. He con-
trasted the "broadness and soundness" of Harlan's opinion with the
"sophistries, the subterfuges" and "technicalities" of the Court's ma-
jority; Justice Harlan had appropriately planted himself "squarely
upon the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the long-established
precedents of the Supreme Court.... ." Fortune wrote approvingly of
Harlan's invocation of the Dred Scott decision and prior judicial sanc-
tion of congressional power to protect the property rights of slave-
owners to regulate the conduct of individuals within states and to im-
pose fines and penalties against those who would have impeded the
retrieval of slaves by their owners. Why had Congress lost the power
to protect the rights of citizens within states? Why was congressional
authority now more constricted, despite amendments to the Constitu-
tion that were intended to expand congressional powers? Fortune
asked, "Is it because the aggrieved are black freemen and not white
slave drivers? Or, rather, is it because the present Supreme court is
deficient in legal acumen, or swayed by color-phobia, or biased by
powerful corporate influences most interested in the decision as ren-
dered?" 224 Fortune ventured that all of these contributed to the
Court's decision. "There is no doubt in our mind that the Constitu-
tion of the United States is broad enough to shield each and every
citizen in his civil and political rights," Fortune wrote. As Justice
Harlan had suggested, the American people had intended that Con-
gress have such power by ratifying the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.225
One year later, Fortune commented on the Cases in an article
published by the A.ME. Church Review. Fortune returned to the
223. Fortune, supra note 1, at 315. Fortune also touched on issues of federalism, as well as on
the political nature of the decisions. "The Government of the United States is the puppet of the
States," he stated disapprovingly, "a thing without power to protect the citizens of its own crea-
tion." Id. He argued, further, that the Cases represented the consequence of an abuse of power
by the Republican Party. The editorial indicated that far from seeing the Court's decision as an
apolitical, reasoned judgment, Fortune believed that it was the Republican party that "has grad-
ually stripped [the colored man] of all the rights which had been given to him for his valor in the
field and his patriotism in time of peace." Id.
224. Mr. Justice Harlan's Opinion of Civil Rights, N.Y. GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1883, at 2.
225. Id.
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Court's suggestion that the Civil Rights Act concerned "the social
rights of men and races in the community," which were not protected
by the postwar amendments. 226 Fortune, first, however, criticized not
only the Court, but also, more generally, the Anglo-Saxon race and its
jurisprudence, for conceding that all have inherent and common rights
and yet yielding nothing from this sense of equity.227 In so arguing,
Fortune repeatedly referred to his own belief in the existence of natu-
ral rights, from which persons cannot justly be alienated.228 Despite
Anglo-Saxon recognition of common rights, Fortune charged, the An-
glo-Saxon "yields only to the force of circumstances. '229 As the Dred
Scott case had established, from the foundation of the United States
until 1865, people of African origin in the United States had only slave
status and had "no rights which the white man was bound to re-
spect. '230 Only the "most sanguinary warfare" had lifted the status of
African Americans to that of full-fledged citizens, endowed with co-
equal rights before the law and in all avenues of civil life. 231
Fortune again criticized the Court for construing the amended
Constitution from the standpoint of the 1850s, rather than 1876, and
for overriding the "obvious letter and spirit of the constitutional
amendments in the matter of the relations of the citizens of States to
the Federal Government. ' 232 The Civil War had been fought to de-
cide the right of a state to secede from the federal compact, and, ac-
cording to Fortune, at the conclusion of the war, constitutional
amendments were intended in letter and spirit to enlarge the powers
226. T. Thomas Fortune, Civil Rights and Social Privileges, A.M.E. CHURCH REV. (1885), at
128-31.
227. Id. at 124; see also id. at 127 (discussing the "absurdity of the claims set up by those who
oppose our enjoyment of what even they concede belongs to us .. "); id. at 129 (stating that
white men have "the constitutional disposition to deny rights they know to be common in their
nature and scope .... ).
228. For example, despite the state of American law before the adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment, Fortune asserted that "holding property in man" was a crime. Moreover, Fortune
argued, the American people's legal sanction for the crime provided ground for claims for repa-
rations. Id. at 123. Fortune also relied on a belief in natural rights when stating that while
obligation was owed the states for ratifying the postwar amendments, the existence of any such
debt depended upon whether "a sense of obligation can obtain in a case where that is returned
which could not, in law or equity, justly have been alienated, usurped or withheld in the first
instance." Id. According to Fortune, even the "savage" had a sense of his natural rights. For-
tune credited the savage with courage, "a vigilant readiness at all times to expose himself to
danger in defense of what he regards as his natural rights." Id. at 119.
229. Id. at 124. Fortune stated, "[I]f you would enjoy these common rights which he con-
cedes belong to you, he makes you contend for them one by one at the ballot-box, in the jury
panel, on the palace car, on steamboats, at the threshold of hotels, and even at the doorway of
... churches .. " Id.
230. Id. at 121 (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857)).
231. Id at 122, 124.
232. Id. at 122. Fortune excepted Justice Harlan from the reach of his criticism.
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of the federal government vis a vis the states. In passing on the Civil
Rights Cases, and, particularly, in ruling that the federal government
was powerless under even the amended Constitution to interfere in
the internal civil affairs of the state, the Court stripped the federal
government of the power needed to enforce law and order and to give
effect to "the full measure of right and justice which attach to the
manumission and enfranchisement of a wronged and defrauded
class. "233
Fortune saved some of his fire, however, for those disposed to
confound civil rights and social privileges, an effort which he termed
"selfish and malicious. ' 234 "Civil rights," Fortune asserted, "comprise
all public benefits sought to be obtained by or insured to individuals
by the organization of mankind into government for mutual protec-
tion and advantage. ' '235 According to Fortune, civil rights were de-
fined and secured by constitutional and statutory enactment, and
regulated by society through its legally constituted tribunals. To For-
tune, it was axiomatic that no citizen possessed a legal prerogative to
enjoy a larger share of public benefits or to enjoy benefits not com-
mon to all citizens.236 This, he declared, "is, or should be, the primal
object of all organized government; and, in so far as it fails to compass
this object, it fails in the essential element of its creation. '237 More-
over, Fortune argued, partiality in the enforcement of civil rights jeop-
ardizes the rights of all and leads to contempt of the rule, for "[tihe
law, or the construction or interpretation of the law, which would cur-
tail, abridge, or deny to any citizen a coequal participation in these
233. Id. at 122-23. Fortune wrote:
It will appear obvious ... that the power of the Federal authority in the jurisdiction of
States,-in the matter of proper protection of life, limb and property and the enforce-
ment of the full measure of such civil rights as inhere in the citizen by reason of his
citizenship,-is as impotent as a new born infant; and that... he might just as well not
be a citizen of the United States.
Id. at 123.
Fortune noted that the citizen denied proper redress by the state courts might still proceed
to federal court with an appeal, on the theory that while federal courts have no jurisdiction over
matters internal to the State, generally, such jurisdiction obtains when a state proclaims its in-
ability to enforce law and order and, in essence, abdicates its sovereign function to the central
government. Id.
234. Id. at 128.
235. Id.
236. Fortune added, "[I]t would be directly in contravention of equity... [that] my neighbor
shall enjoy a certain public benefit, but I shall not. In our government the theory is that no man
shall have advantage before the law to the detriment of his neighbor." Id. at 129. Unfortu-
nately, though, theory and practice in the United States "are often sorely out of joint with each
other." This dissonance was "painfully true" when the judiciary was called upon to decide mat-
ters between black and white citizens, especially in the South. Id.
237. Id. at 128.
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benefits, public in their nature, and operating directly upon the consti-
tution of society, is a flagrant miscarriage of justice .... -231 By con-
trast, Fortune defined social privileges as "regulated wholly by
individual tastes and inclinations, and ... in no sense subject to the
cognizance or supervision of government. ' 239 Whereas every citizen
could demand civil rights, social privileges could be won only by con-
duct, position, abilities, and affluence. 24°
In his first editorial comment on the Court's decision, Cleveland
Gazette managing editor H.C. Smith declared with dismay, "[W]e are
again excluded from all rights of a citizen except in the exercise of the
ballot, and there is not surety of our keeping this."' 241 Smith rejected
the idea that the decision was merely a ploy to affect party politics, 242
a notion that had circulated along with the suggestion that the spon-
sors of the Civil Rights Act had known during the legislative process
that the Act would be declared unconstitutional. Smith believed, in-
stead, that the Act was constitutional, and that the decision was a con-
sequence of the fact that "the Court is toadying to the South in
establishing the Calhoun theory of 'States Rights' ....,243 Smith ar-
gued that the ruling would have a tremendous impact in both the
North, where hundreds of places of public accommodation would
close their doors to African Americans and to other minorities, and
the South, where African Americans would feel the full weight of the
decision. The law provided no protection for the southern freedmen,
238. Id. at 129. Fortune listed a number of actions that constituted a denial of civil rights and
that, therefore, were of menace to all. These included barring the free passageway to the ballot
box of an individual or class, invidious discrimination in the accommodation and convenience of
travel and in places of public amusement, separate schools, and the enactment of miscegenation
laws. Id. at 128.
239. Id. at 131.
240. Id.
241. Civil Rights Law: Declared Unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, CLEv. GAZETTE,
Oct. 20, 1883, at 2. Smith noted that congressional jurisdiction to pass legislation protecting civil
rights remained in the territories and the District of Columbia. Id.
Smith and Gazette president John F. Lightfoot had provided an earlier indication of their
editorial position in a column on the outcome of a test case before a lower court earlier in the
year. See CLEv. GAzEra, Aug. 25, 1883.
242. A column written by the Hon. John P. Green, which also appeared in the October 20
edition of the Gazette, argued for a political reading of the Court's decision: "I sadly fear that the
men who are in control of the Republican party at Washington are, just now, sacrificing principal
to machine politics; and that, in their over-zealous efforts to please [Southern] party leaders ...,
they may alienate their old allies-the colored Republicans-from the party .... Hon. John P.
Green, Civil Rights: Deep Game Being Played by Arthur Politicians-What Next?, CLEv. GA-
ZEIrE, Oct. 20, 1883, at 2.
243. Civil Rights Law: Declared Unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, CtFnv. GAZETTE,
Oct. 20, 1883, at 2.
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and whites could, thus, "carry social ostracism to any extent without
fear of law."
'2 "4
Smith advocated three responses to remedy the situation. First,
African Americans must continue to work in their own interest: "[We]
have our own destiny to work out, and the sooner we stop crying the
Republican party will do it, or any other party, and settle down to
work, the sooner our progression will be more noticeable, ourselves
and rights demand more respect and attention. ' 245 Second, Smith rec-
ommended the passage of civil rights legislation in the states, although
he admitted that this strategy would be of limited success: "There is
positively no hope of all the Southern States adopting such a law,"
Smith wrote.246 Third, Smith suggested that African Americans work
for a constitutional amendment that would include the guarantees of
the Civil Rights Act. To pursue these ends, Smith favored convening
a mass "indignation meeting," and joined others in calling for a state
convention of African-American men to meet in Columbus in late
December. 2
47
The stated position of the People's Advocate was critical but opti-
mistic. 248 To the Advocate, the ruling reflected poorly on the Court,
which failed to interpret the Constitution in light of events that had
occurred since the Civil War. In its decision, the Court had followed
the lead of lower courts that had "boldly" asserted the unconstitution-
ality of the Civil Rights Act, ignoring the principles that had guided
the period of Reconstruction and, instead, catering to economic
interests.2
49
While the Civil Rights Cases would have a "moral effect" and de-




247. SPYE-Call of a State Convention, CLEv. GAZETTE, Dec. 15, 1883, at 1. Smith was not
the only discussant in the vast and varied conversation about the Cases to attempt to exclude
women from the activities he envisioned. The historical record is replete with remarks such as
his, which were specifically addressed to men. Regrettably, scant written evidence remains of
African-American women's perspectives.
248. See The Civil Rights Decision, PEoPLE's ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 20, 1883,
at 2; see also Some Corrections, PEOPLE's ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 27, 1883, at 2.
249. The Civil Rights Decision, PEoPLE's ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 20, 1883, at 2.
By contrast, the Advocate praised Justice Harlan who, the paper reported, "[showed] a willing-
ness to let no technicalities of constitutional interpretation, developed in a long political struggle
to subvert the National authority to that of the States, stand in the way of the equal Civil Rights
of all citizens." PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 20, 1883, at 2. The paper also
applauded Colonel Ingersoll, calling his argument that the Supreme Court could have reached
the opposite decision, consistent with its earlier decisions, "conclusive." PEoPLE's ADVOCATE
(Washington, D.C.), Oct. 27, 1883, at 2.
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do not move backward. The paper suggested that the decision would
have little impact in areas where, as a result of prior judicial decisions
or favorable public sentiment, the civil rights of African Americans
were already respected. In other localities, the decision would set the
cause of civil rights back, but the fight for equal rights would continue:
"The Supreme Court has not the power to stay the march of progress
any more now than it did when the Dred Scott decision was ren-
dered," the Advocate contended, "[that decision] was an anachronism.
So is this. '25
0
Moreover, the Advocate took note of a loophole left by the
Court-the possibility of finding the authority for congressional regu-
lations pursuant to the Commerce Clause. The paper reported that
Congressman O'Hara had an excellent opportunity to introduce a bill
to meet the Court's objections and "still prevent citizens from distant
states being subjected to outrage while on common carriers."'251
The paper also emphasized other ways in which the Court had
limited its decision. Most importantly, the Court had not decided that
African Americans did not have the right to the full and equal enjoy-
ment of public accommodations, but, rather, only that Congress had
not the power under the postwar amendments to create legislation
regulating discriminatory conduct within the states. Under the Four-
teenth Amendment the provisions remained in effect in the District of
Columbia and the territories, and, as previously noted, the Court indi-
cated that Congress might enact legislation to prevent discrimination
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.252
Journalist John Edward Bruce reflected upon the Civil Rights
Cases in speeches delivered in November of 1883.253 In the first, an
address to the Bethesda Literary Society in Georgetown, Bruce sug-
gested that the Supreme Court's decision exemplified the white race's
effort to oppress African Americans, referring to the "parsimonious
quibblings of prejudiced judges" as one of the devices used by the
white race "to change the order of nature and to set itself up as the
special favorite of heaven. '' 254 Although Bruce denied that he was
prepared to argue the legal technicalities, he denounced the Court's
250. The Civil Rights Decision, PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 20, 1883, at 2.
251. PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 20, 1883, at 2.
252. Some Corrections, PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 27, 1883, at 2.
253. John E. Bruce, Reflections on the Decision in the Civil Rights Cases and Is This Our
Country, in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF JoiN EDWARD BRUCE: MILITANT BLACK JOURNALIST
19-26 (Peter Gilbert ed., 1971).
254. Id. at 20.
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action on a number of grounds. First, the ruling conflicted with a
higher form of law and was, in essence, immoral:
The decision of the Supreme Court... can never annul the decision
of that highest of courts, which fixed the Status of every man from
the Creation of the world when it declared that out of one blood
were created all the nations that dwell upon the face of the
earth .... 255
Second, the Cases denied African Americans the very rights that other
citizens enjoyed, a denial in conflict with the Constitution's grant of
citizenship. Bruce asked whether the Supreme Court meant to reaf-
firm the infamous holding of Dred Scott, that African Americans had
no rights white men were bound to respect.256 Moreover, the decision
left African Americans again vulnerable, opening the door for white
Southerners to repeat the kind of atrocious crimes, to which African
Americans had previously been subjected.257 And, finally, by refusing
to grant the national government the ability and power to protect citi-
zens, the Court had virtually acknowledged state sovereignty, while
continuing to profess opposition to the doctrine.
258
Bruce delivered a second address in which he highlighted the
Court's decision as exemplifying the disparity between the ideals of
the nation and its practices. "The government of the United States on
paper is one of the best governments that ever saw the light of day,"
Bruce stated, but "[p]ractically it is not. '259 Bruce called the Constitu-
tion and the Declaration of Independence, as far as they related to
African Americans, "the blackest lies ever evolved from the inaugura-
tion of the Sainted Fathers. '' 26° Just as the founding fathers had never
meant to allow African Americans to enjoy the benefits and privileges
"which a proper and just observance of [the Constitution and the Dec-
laration] sought to bestow," the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments failed to guarantee to African Americans true protec-
tion.261 While the amendments may have been well-intended and
were written for the especial benefit of African Americans, their en-
forcement required additional actions by the federal government, and
the Court's decision reinforced Bruce's belief that African Americans
could scarcely rely on the good will of the majority of whites. Bruce
255. Id.
256. Id. at 21.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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asked whether African Americans could consider the United States
"our country"? He answered, "Morally and of right it is our country,
socially and politically it is not our country, but simply our abiding
place."'2 2 Citizenship would not be real until every person of every
race and nationality were secure in his or her civil and political rights.
The United States "will never be our country," Bruce asserted, "while
the Constitution remains inoperative and the laws on the Statute
books are playthings of the Supreme Court.
'263
In December of 1883, Bruce began serving as managing editor of
the Washington, D.C. Grit, and in his first editorial, Bruce again con-
demned the Cases:
The recent infamous decision of the Supreme Court has placed the
negro where the war left him, only in a more helpless condition; for
there we had the 'whole power of the administration' at our back.
Now we have it against us, judging from the indifference with which
the treatment of our people received at the hands of the
Judiciary .... 264
At first blush, the Arkansas Mansion's position on the Cases
seems to stand out as an anomaly among African-American newspa-
pers. Indeed, as one paper, the Loneke Democrat, reported, "Henry
Simkens, the editor of the Arkansas Mansion, for colored folks, stands
solitary and alone among the colored press in justifying the recent de-
cisions on the civil rights bill. '265 Simkens downplayed the impor-
tance of the ruling and even argued that the treatment of African
262. 1& at 23.
263. Id. at 24.
264. Salutatory, THE GRrr (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 21, 1883. This issue was the paper's
first. The Rev. W. B. Bruce was listed as editor, J.E. Bruce as managing editor. At the outset,
the paper asserted that it would advocate an independent position: "THE GRIT IS NEITHER
FOR, NOR AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION, BUT FOR THE PEOPLE." THE Gpr,
Dec. 21, 1883, at 1 (immediately under the newpaper's title).
265. Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 17, 1883, at 1. Significantly,
however, there is evidence that at least some other African Americans in the South also reacted
to the Court's decision with both cynicism about the intent of the Act, and of the Republican
party, and with a hand of cooperation extended to Southern whites. See, e.g., State News,
HUNTSVILLE GAZETTE (Alabama), Nov. 10, 1883, at 2 (coverage of the Birmingham meeting at
which Rev. J.H. Welch, the chair of the meeting, advocated "the cultivation of more friendly
relations with the whites of the South." Welch is quoted as stating, "that the southern people,
without regard to party lines, would prove the last refuge of the colored people, and would help
them to reach a higher and nobler manhood."); see also PEOPLE's ADVOCATE (Washington,
D.C.), Oct. 27, 1883, at 2 (excerpt from the Mobile Gazette, in which the Gazette emphasized the
willingness of African Americans in the South to cooperate with whites). In a speech before the
National Educational Association, Booker T. Washington, though he did not mention the Cases
directly, offered an opinion on the strategy to be followed in the aftermath of the Court's ruling:
"Any movement for the elevation of the Southern Negro, in order to be successful," Washington




Americans by "the more favored races" was better left unregulated by
law.266 "Now [that] the farsical civil rights bill has been annulled by
the supreme court of the United States, equal rights falls back upon its
merit where it rightfully should," Simkens argued.267
Without the Civil Rights Act, Simkens contended, African Amer-
icans would have more incentive to acquire knowledge and wealth,
which would, in turn, lead to recognition and equal treatment.268 In-
telligence and wealth were the keys to respect. Civil rights legislation
was not only ineffectual, according to the editor, but counterproduc-
tive, in that it removed "all the superior virtues of colored people"
The best course to pursue in regard to the civil rights bill in the South is to let it alone;
let it alone and it will settle itself. Good school-teachers and plenty of money to pay
them will be more potent in settling the race question than many civil rights bills....
Booker T. Washington, Speech Delivered Before the National Educational Association in
Madison, Wisconsin (July 1884), in 2 A DocuMrENrARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN
THE UNITED STATES 649 (Herbert Aptheker ed., 1951) [hereinafter 2 DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY]. On the other hand, some African-American papers published in the South firmly re-
jected compromise. "The work of the past was accomplished not by 'coalescing' with enemies,
but by fighting and beating them," wrote D. McD. Lindsey of the North Carolina Republican.
N.C. REPUBLICAN, May 22, 1884. In 1884 the Republican endorsed an effort to overcome the
Court's adverse ruling on the Civil Rights Act led by Senator Edmunds of Vermont, arguing, "If
the constitution shall be found obstinately in the way of the full security of Civil Rights by
Congressional legislation then the Constitution must be amended." IL On May 22, 1884, the
Republican printed the full text of Senator Edmunds's bill, which was introduced and referred to
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on December 4, 1883.
Surviving issues of the Savannah Weekly Echo, a paper edited by Thomas T. Harden that
provided extensive coverage of congressional action, domestic policy, and foreign affairs, suggest
that despite the paper's Southern location, the Echo endorsed Justice Harlan's dissent. See SA-
VANNAH WEEKLY ECHO, Dec. 2, 1883 (covering Justice Harlan's opinion); SAVANNAH WEEKLY
ECHO, Jan. 20, 1884 (discussing a pamphlet that contained a sermon given in Washington, D.C.,
by Rev. J.E. Rankin entitled, "The State and the Citizen of the State," which the paper consid-
ered "of much interest to our people especially when it is known that it is in regard to the late
Civil Rights decision"; and noting, further, that the pamphlet was dedicated to Justice Harlan
because of "the manly and determined standpoint he assumed in favor of the colored Ameri-
can"). Similarly, surviving issues of the Weekly Defiance, published in Atlanta, Georgia, and
edited by Rev. W.H. Heard, suggest that the paper would not have allied itself with the Man-
sion's point of view. See WEEKLY DEFIANCE, Feb. 24, 1883 ("Manhood says I have rights as a
citizen of these United States.... I am a part and parsol of this nation, and I intend to trouble it
until every right comes .... ).
266. Equal Rights, ARK. MANSION, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1.
267. Id. Compare Civil Rights, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1 (restating the position
that the actions of the Republican party during the years of Reconstruction were ill advised:
"[the party] could not protect us by constitutional law and undertook to do it by unconstitutional
measures which has in a great many instances served as a scarecrow, but did considerable harm
in others.") with PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 27, 1883 (excerpt from the Vir-
ginia Star, in which the Star downplayed the potential effect of the decision, citing the spirit of
resistance to the law that had been generated by a belief, held by a large number of whites, that
civil rights should have been left entirely to the states; the Star explicitly declined to offer an
opinion as to the validity of this view, stating that it was sufficient to know that the belief had
engendered opposition to the law).
268. "[T]he more you try to down a meritorious man," Simkens wrote, "the higher he rises in
the estimation of his peers. Hence, intelligence must and will rule, numerical majorities to the
contrary notwithstanding." ARK. MANSION, Nov. 17, 1883.
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and transformed them "into one class, and that the lowest class."
With the education and professionalization of African Americans,
Simkens proclaimed, "cast [i.e. racial] prejudice will in time die of it-
self sooner than it could be killed by any special legislation. '269
The Mansion stated a slightly different position a week after its
initial editorial. The editor still disagreed with the tone of alarm
sounded by "the colored people" in response to the Cases, but he
downplayed the significance of the decision rather than repeating the
suggestion that the Court's action would secure greater respect for
civil rights. The Court had not touched rights guaranteed by the Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, Simkens argued: the
constitutional laws granting equal rights and privileges had not been
disturbed by the Court's action. Only the "modus operandi of insti-
tuting the suit" had been changed from the United States district
courts to the courts of the respective states, and Simkens found this
change of little consequence. Indeed, Simkens now stressed the im-
portance of access to the courts for redress.270 He noted that it was
now necessary for each state to pass civil rights bills to provide a right
of action and to fix penalties,271 and he emphasized that aggrieved
269. ARK. MANSION, Oct. 27, 1883.
270. Simkens replaced his earlier aversion to civil rights legislation and emphasis on self-help
with an acknowledgement of the importance of recourse to the courts and a rose-colored, but
more detailed interpretation of the Court's decision. Pursuant to the decision, Simkens wrote,
rights were not only enforceable in state court, but remained enforceable in federal court in a
number of circumstances. For example, the ruling left unaffected the ability of government em-
ployees, United States homesteaders, and citizens of the territories to pursue their claims in
either state or federal courts. Moreover, United States admiralty courts continued to have con-
current jurisdiction over violations of the laws occurring on the high seas or navigable waters;
and, Simkens argued, picking up on the loophole left by the Court, despite the Court's ruling,
federal courts retained jurisdiction to decide allegations of discrimination by common carriers
traveling interstate. Simkens wrote, "[W]e think that a case brought would prove that the
United States has concurrent jurisdiction over railroad cases, where the road is not confined
entirely to one state, as the judges well protected themselves by saying that congress may have
power to regulate commerce ... among the several states .... In Response to Plebian's Inquiry,
ARK. MANSION, Nov. 24, 1883, at 1. Indeed, abrogations of contract also remained remediable:
"If a man or corporation takes your money to give you specified accommodations," Simkens
advised his readers, "he is bound at law and in equity for the obligation of contract." Id.
271. The Mansion specifically endorsed state legislation in another article appearing in the
same issue of the paper. The article reported, "A mass meeting of colored people at Keokuk...
resolved to ask the legislature of Iowa to adopt the sections of the civil rights bill recently de-
cided unconstitutional." ARK. MANSION, Nov. 3, 1883, at 1. The Mansion opined that such an
act would not be "special legislation," and endorsed the effort. Id. Subsequent editions of the
Mansion, however, reported that Arkansas already had a civil rights law on the books and ex-
pressed the opinion that the citizens of the state required no additional legislation. Civil Rights,
ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1; see also A Civil Rights Inquiry, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 17,
1883, at 1 (letter from "A Plebian").
19951
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
persons who felt unfairly treated in state court retained their right to
appeal adverse state court decisions to the federal courts.272
Simkens backpedaled, again, in editorials appearing on Novem-
ber 10 and 17. "In denouncing the civil rights bill to be farcical,"
Simkens wrote, "it was not our intention to reflect discreditably upon
neither the originators of the bill nor the republican party."273
Simkens continued to maintain that the Act, as passed, was unconsti-
tutional but explained, "we called it farcical because public opinion
prohibited its enforcement, as under our laws all men are entitled to a
trial by jury. ' 274 "Public sentiment rules supreme," Simkens argued,
"civil rights laws to the contrary notwithstanding. '2
75
Indeed, both Simkens's suggestion that the Act was, in fact, un-
constitutional and, also, his approval of the Court's decision seem to
rest squarely on his belief that public opinion "is in all cases the
supreme law of the land. '276 Simkens statement, thus, relied on a dis-
tinction between the correct determination of law and assertions
about morality; his approval of the Court's action took issue only with
those who would criticize the correctness of the decision and was not
necessarily a defense of its moral worthiness.277 The distinction is
seen more clearly in Simkens' response to the Louisville Bulletin's ar-
gument that the decisions in Dred Scott and the Civil Rights Cases
were incompatible. Simkens argues, to the contrary, that while the
272. Our Civil Rights Held Inviolate, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 3, 1883, at 1. The paper's position
paralleled an interpretation of the law offered by Attorney General Brewster in a letter pub-
lished by the Mansion on the same date as its second editorial. Brewster's letter stated that
African Americans retained particular rights pursuant to the United States Constitution, that the
U.S. executive and Congress were powerless to interfere for the protection of the rights of citi-
zenship, that these rights could only be enforced in state court, and that appeals from judgments
of state courts could be brought to the federal courts. The Rights of Negroes: A Letter from
Attorney-General Brewster-The Only Remedy for Grievance, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 3, 1883, at
1.
It is perhaps also significant that the Mansion reprinted excerpts from the editorial state-
ments of white-controlled Arkansas papers, the Arkansas Gazette, the Arkansas Democrat and
the Arkansas Methodist, in which the Mansion's editorial opinion was cited with approval. Civil
Rights: Opinions of the Press, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 3, 1883, at 1; Civil Rights: Opinions of the
Press, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1; see also Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press, ARu.
MANSION, Nov. 17, 1883, at 1 (excerpt from Loneke Democrat).
273. ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1; see also ARK. MANSION, Nov. 17, 1883, at 1.
274. ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1.
275. Id. The Court, thus, had merely disrobed African Americans of an ineffective shield,
which, however, had been "in good faith thrown around us for a safeguard." Id. The November
10 editorial appeared again, largely unchanged, in the November 17 edition of the Mansion.
276. ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883.
277. A similar argument was put forward by the Mansion's Washington correspondent: "Un-
doubtedly, [the decision] is a back-set in some respects to [the colored] race, but whatever our
views of its effects, it is useless to berate the court, for the decision is undoubtedly correct law."
Washington Letter, ARK. MANSION, Dec. 1, 1883, at 1.
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Dred Scott decision would have been wrong under the order of things
in 1883, that the case was in accordance with the law in the 1850s,
which was determined by the prevailing sentiment. This realism about
the law in no way suggests that Simkens believed that the Dred Scott
decision was morally right.278
Although the Mansion never retracted its initial statement of ap-
proval for the Court's decision,279 a layer of cautious disapproval, or
veiled criticism was thus also apparent. Interestingly, at the end of its
October 27 editorial extolling the virtues of self-help over the enforce-
ment of civil rights on "an unwilling people," Simkens advised pa-
tience. "[I]f we cant stay in the states," the editor recommended, "let
us go to the United States territories [where, according to contempo-
raneous interpretations of the Cases, the Court's invalidation of the
Civil Rights Act would not apply], not to Africa."'280 Similarly, in its
article on Bishop Turner's views, the Mansion sounded resigned
about, rather than approving of the Court's decision. What more
could African Americans have expected from a test case brought
before the Court? "[I]t was evident that somebody had to be disap-
pointed, and as usual it fell upon us."'281
Excerpts from editorials found in a number of additional African-
American newspapers appear in the pages of newspapers that have
been preserved, such as the Mansion, even though copies of the origi-
nals may not be accessible. The content of these editorials generally
fall within the range of perspectives offered by the writers discussed
above. For example, the Negro Newspaper Microfilm Series contains
some editions of the Plaindealer of Detroit, but only those issued be-
tween 1889 and 1892. Nevertheless, the Arkansas Mansion's coverage
of the Cases includes the following quote from the Detroit Plaindealer:
The decision of the supreme court in the civil rights cases causes
almost universal disapproval of the people, both white and colored,
278. Id. Indeed, Simkens used his disagreement with the holding of Dred Scott as the basis
for a challenge to those who applauded Justice Harlan's dissent. The Mansion's initial coverage
of the dissent was brief, and Simkens limited his criticism to a few sentences that focused on the
consequences of granting Congress the power to legislate to grant or to remove the liberty of
citizens: "With [Justice Harlan,] the Dred Scott decision, Fugitive Slave Law and the Civil Rights
Bill, are in accord with the Constitution, and black men applaud him, but the writer is one of
those that says, 'Give us liberty or death."' Our Opinion of Justice Harlan's Views, ARK. MAN-
SION, Dec. 1, 1883, at 1.
279. "The facts are in a nutshell," the Mansion editorial stated on November 3, in agreement
with the Court, "the United States congress had not constitutional right to legislate or make laws
for the government of the citizens of the several states, as each state is a sovereign of itself...
Our Civil Rights Held Inviolate, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 3, 1883, at 1.
280. Equal Rights, ARK. MANSION, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1.
281. Turner on the Civil Rights, ARK. MANSION, Oct. 27, 1883, at 1.
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in Detroit. It still remains an insult to the memory of Lincoln, who
freed this race, and to Sumner who introduced the bill. It gives the
lie to truths asserted and maintained by Webster, Edmunds and
Butler, all able statesmen and lawyers. It is ignoring to the names of
those who fought and bled, be they living or dead.282
The Mansion's sample of editorial opinions also includes an excerpt
from an editorial appearing in the Cincinnati Afro-American, which
argued that the Court's decision left African-American travelers at
the mercy of "any irresponsible ruffian who chooses to abuse him. '283
The Mansion also contains a passage from the Afro-American that in-
cludes a call for the national executive committee formed by the re-
cent national colored convention to convene in order to discuss the
Court's decision.284 An excerpt from the Paris (Texas) Laborer in-
cludes the announcement that African Americans would react to the
Court's decision by redoubling their energies "to make the race felt
and respected as Americans citizens." "By so doing," the Laborer ad-
ded, "we will lay up for ourselves rights where supreme courts cannot
corrupt nor Judge Bradley break through and steal. '28
5
III. JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE
In an article published by the A.ME. Church Review in 1887, Ev-
erett James Waring, an African-American lawyer in Baltimore, dis-
cussed the formation, purpose, and activities of the United
Brotherhood of Liberty.286 According to Waring, the Brotherhood
was "composed of some of the most prominent colored men in the
United States, ' 28 7 who intended "to test in the courts infringement of
282. Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 3, 1883, at 1.
283. Id.
284. ARK. MANSION, Nov. 10, 1883, at 1.
285. Civil Rights: Opinions of the Press, ARK. MANSION, Nov. 17, 1883, at 1 (excerpt from
Paris Laborer (Texas)).
286. Waring, E.J., The Colored Man Before the Law, 3 A.M.E. CHURCH REV. 496 (1887),
reprinted in part in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 265, at 695-96 (under the heading
Mutual United Brotherhood of Liberty, 1887). For more information on Waring, the Brother-
hood of Liberty, and the growth of the African-American bar in Baltimore, see J. CLAY SMITH,
JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944, at 142-49 (1993); David
S. Bogen, Maryland's First Black Attorney, in 100m ANNIVERSARY OF THE ADMISSION OF Ev-
ERETF J. WARING THE FIRST BLACK LAWYER TO BE ADMITrED TO THE BAR IN MARYLAND
(Bar Association of Baltimore City and the Monumental City Bar Association, 1985); J. Clay
Smith, Jr., Justice and Jurisprudence and the Black Lawyer, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1077
(1994); Bettye C. Thomas, Public Education and Black Protest in Baltimore, 1865-1900, 71 MD.
HIST. MAG. 381 (1976); A. Briscoe Koger, Dr. Harvey Johnson-Pioneer Civic Leader (1957)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore, Maryland); Wil-
liam G. Paul, The Shadow of Equality: The Negro in Baltimore, 1864-1911, at 205-10 (1972)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin).
287. Waring, supra note 286, at 503 (quoting an interview with a News reporter given by
himself), reprinted in part in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 265, at 695.
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the rights of colored people, whether as a race or as individu-
als .... -"288 The Brotherhood believed that appeal to the courts would
complement political efforts, and Waring outlined the role of litigation
in challenging oppression based on race:
We should organize the country over. Raise funds and employ
counsel. Then, if an individual is denied some right or privilege, let
the race make his wrong their wrong and test the cause in law....
Some may say that this is futile-that we shall fail. Suppose we do
at first, do we not know that in the end, phoenix-like, there will
emerge from a sea of failures glorious success.
289
In 1889, the Brotherhood published Justice and Jurisprudence, a
treatise on the status of civil rights and a tremendous source for analy-
ses of African-American perspectives on the law in the 1880s.290 In it,
the Brotherhood made clear their perception that the postwar amend-
ments "introduced into the Constitution a new, fundamental civil sys-
tem" with the "deepest constitutional significance" 291 and offered a
critical analysis of the Court's retreat on civil rights. They charged
that the Court misinterpreted the Reconstruction Amendments, ig-
nored precedent, manipulated language to justify outcomes, and
founded decisions on prejudice and policies instead of higher law and
the forward march of morality. The book includes a preface, which
paints the Brotherhood's argument in broad brush strokes, a dedica-
tory address, a letter from the Brotherhood to "their brethren the citi-
zens of the United States of African descent," correspondence
between the Brotherhood and their Counsel, and forty-six chapters of
argument against the legitimacy and logic of both the Civil Rights
288. Waring, supra note 286, at 503, reprinted in part in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 265, at 695.
289. Waring, supra note 286, at 504, reprinted in part in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 265, at 696. In support of the utility of a legal approach, Waring cited four cases that had
successfully vindicated the rights of African Americans in Maryland, including a suit by three
Baltimore women who were denied accommodations on a steamer on the basis of their race.
Waring, supra note 286, at 504, reprinted in part in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 265, at
696. "[W]hen white men deny us our rights," Waring wrote, "let us call them into court and
compel them to defend the wrong." Waring, supra note 286, at 504, reprinted in part in 2 Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 265, at 696. The strategy outlined by Waring presaged the suc-
cessful course of action developed and implemented by Charles Hamilton Houston and
Thurgood Marshall in the 1930s and 1940s to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson.
290. Some question exists as to whether the organization described by Waring is the same
body that drafted and issued Justice and Jurisprudence. The book depicts the Brotherhood as an
organization of African Americans dedicated to legal reform, but, unfortunately, offers no list of
members and credits no individuals with authorship. For further discussion of authorship, see
Smith, supra note 286, at 1077, 1085-86 n.41 (1994).
291. JusIcE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 484.
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Cases and Hall v. DeCuir,292 which comprise the bulk of the text.
These sections are followed by a lengthy digest of laws and cases relat-
ing to civil rights. A sprinkling of quotations from a variety of philos-
ophers, statesmen, and jurists opens each section and chapter.
293
The preface, the letter to brethren, and the dedicatory address
are each signed by the Brotherhood of Liberty. In the preface, the
Brotherhood summarized the book's two main themes:
The first concerns the Positive Law of the Fourteenth Amendment,
by which the whole power of the American state is pledged to main-
tain the equality of civil rights of every American citizen by Due
Process of Law. The second discloses the transparent veils of legal
fiction under cover of which the civil rights of all races are being
slowly undermined.2
94
The Brotherhood proposed that judicial interpretation threatened to
unravel the constitutional structure underlying the American republic,
which the Brotherhood defined as "liberty regulated by law.
'295
In the dedicatory address, the Brotherhood elaborated on its pur-
pose. Justice and Jurisprudence was intended to provide an exposition
of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and, thereby, also of-
fer a defense of the reign of constitutional law and the liberty of all
Americans.296 The effort responded to the Brotherhood's perception
that recent decisions by the Court were eroding judicial protection for
civil rights, in defiance of the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"It appears to your addressers," the text asserts, "that civil-rights doc-
trines are [in a] ... mischievous state, and that the decisions of the
courts are involved in an intricate tangle of verbal mysticism .... ,,297
292. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878) (invalidating a Louisiana statute that forbade trans-
portation companies from segregating passengers by race on the ground that the regulation bur-
dened interstate commerce).
293. The entries range from Bentham's "Plain law and plain sense," JusncE AND JURIsPRU-
DENCIE, supra note 5, at 47, to analyses of legal subjects. The introductory section preceding the
first chapter of the book, for example, includes single quotations from Disraeli, Voltaire,
Hooker, Epea Pteroenta, Bolingbroke, Tilden, Pascal, Everett, Bacon, Stahl, Sismondi,
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Constantine, Addison, U.S. Grant, R.E. Lee, Lao-Tze, J. Black,
Shakespeare, Seward, Jefferson, and multiple quotations from Lincoln, Justice Harlan, Mulford,
Milton, Nicolay and Hay, D'Aubigne, President Harrison, Madison, Swift, Webster, and
Washington.
294. Id. at i.
295. Id. at v.
296. Throughout the address, the Brotherhood emphasized that the proper enforcement of
the Fourteenth Amendment was in the general interest, not only that of African Americans, and
would promote general happiness. See, e.g., id., at 21 ("if the principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment be carried into every region of civil right . . . it will in time prove to be of the
greatest advantage to... the general happiness, and the practical prosperity of the whole Ameri-
can people."); id. at 54 ("if Jurisprudence can with safety pluck Justice by the nose... [it] will
eventually overturn our whole system of government.").
297. Id. at 7.
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According to the Brotherhood, the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed for the protection of the civil rights of African Americans,298
and recent cases had abandoned this intent with opinions marked by
"false refinement, obscurity, and injustice. ' '29
9
Moreover, the Court's rulings had left the status of African
Americans to the vagaries and whims of regional powers. The incon-
sistent administration of justice across the country that resulted had "a
tendency to create two distinct civic classes under the same govern-
ment,-a most pernicious result, and one which the noble framers of
the amendments especially sought to avoid."300 The Court's relega-
tion of responsibility to local authorities created a form of tyranny,
298. Id. at 10. The Brotherhood easily reconciled their view that the postwar amendments
were designed specifically to bring African Americans from slavery to freedom and to ensure the
rights of African Americans, with the position that the "Fourteenth Amendment obliterated the
race-line so far as all rights fundamental in a state of freedom are concerned." Id. at 9; see also
id. at 347, 476; Waring, supra note 286, at 499, 504 (arguing that the postwar amendments were
designed both to remedy the grievances of the newly freed race, in particular, and, also, intended
to serve a color-blind ideal-i.e., that "[n]ot the texture of hair, not race, not color of skin, but
character is the sublime test and criterion among men and angels"). In suggesting that the Four-
teenth Amendment "obliterated the race-line," the Brotherhood proposed that the amendment
sought to eradicate racial discrimination; they were not suggesting that race was irrelevant to the
passage of the post-war amendments, its terms, or its proper interpretation. See, e.g., Waring,
supra note 286, at 500 (the amendments were intended to replace the rule of Dred Scott, which
had established in America a doctrine of absolutism based on race); see also id. at 497 (arguing,
in defense of African-American assertions of the rights of citizenship, "The white man draws the
color line. He has always drawn it.... Tell me not that we draw the color line; that moral crime
lies at the white man's door.").
More specifically, according to the Brotherhood the postwar amendments were intended to
protect the new status and the rights granted African Americans, and such protection was neces-
sary to eradicate discrimination against African Americans on the basis of race, color, or previ-
ous condition of servitude. This contextual interpretation of the amendments was similar to the
oft-quoted passage of the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1873) (cited with
approval in Waring, supra note 286, at 499), in which the Court stated, "It is true that only the
15th Amendment in terms mentions the Negro by speaking of his color and his slavery. But it is
just as true that each of the other articles was addressed to the grievances of that race, and
designed to remedy them as the 15th."
The Brotherhood's view of the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment and their support for
judicial protection against prejudice is at odds with many current invocations of color-blind read-
ings of the Constitution, which often neglect the context and specific purpose of the amendments
and, instead, suggest that the amendments were intended to protect individuals, not groups. See,
e.g., Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1163 (Cal. 1976), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) ("[Tlhe equal protection clause by its literal terms applies to 'any
person,' and its lofty purpose, to secure equality of treatment to all, is incompatible with the
premise that some races may be afforded a higher degree of protection against unequal treat-
ment than others."). The Counsel to the Brotherhood of Liberty argued that the postwar
amendments were, indeed, intended to foster individuality "to its fullest expression," but, he
stated, they would do so by placing "in eternal bondage the unconstitutional element of race-
antagonism in the society of America," not by ignoring the nation's history of slavery, segrega-
tion, and discrimination. JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 483.
299. JUsTIC AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 10-11. The Brotherhood accused the
courts of allowing prejudice to influence decision-making and warned that the judiciary should
not "legalize customs" that were both subversive of the Constitution and immoral. Id.
300. Id. at 7.
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handing one class of citizens the power of meting out the civil rights of
the other, a situation that was particularly injurious since whites had
long regarded African Americans as objects of social and civil con-
tempt. Without federal protection of the rights of African Americans
by the federal courts, "the invasions of majorities are as unlimited and
unconscionable as their power over minorities is absolute."'301 The re-
sulting discriminatory treatment to which African Americans would
be subjected violated the intent of the post-war amendments and was,
thus, unconstitutional. 302
The recent rulings of the Court had not only violated the intent of
positive law, according to the Brotherhood, but they also conflicted
with divine truths and, more specifically, the spirit of mercy, modera-
tion, and benevolence that forms the basis for civil government and is
connected to the special destiny of the American people. 30 3
In subsequent passages about the intent of those who framed and
ratified the postwar amendments, the Counsel again acknowledged
the influence of religious teaching on the amendments and, in particu-
lar, the debt owed the Gospel of St. Luke for its vision of goodwill
toward all people, be they Jew or Gentile, white or black.3°4 The
framers of the amendments "determined to follow the precedent set
by the great law-giver of the enslaved Israelites" and, thus, enscribed
the love of liberty and foundation for civil rights into the
Constitution. 305
The Brotherhood proffered a distinction between "justice" and
"jurisprudence," and argued that the Fourteenth Amendment repre-
sented a command for justice in American law.30 6 The role of juris-
prudence was to expound on the correct application of principles,
301. Id. at 14.
302. Although Justice and Jurisprudence focused primarily on the meaning and proper con-
struction of the Fourteenth Amendment, the book also sheds light on the Brotherhood's inter-
pretation of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. For instance, in a passage of interest to
students of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Brotherhood wrote, "the ancient system of slavery
in America consisted of many parts, having a social, civil, political, and ecclesiastical character."
Id. at 12-13.
303. Id. at 14-15. The Brotherhood described the protection and enforcement of civil rights
as "subservient alike to the teachings of the gospel of Christ and to the mandates of the Consti-
tution of the United States as augmented by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Articles
of Amendment .... I d. at 21-22. In a later section of the book, the Brotherhood reiterate that
the legal status of civil rights, as established by the Fourteenth Amendment, is based on the
Christian belief that "the soul of each human being is alike precious and immortal in the sight of
the great Author of nature and government." Id. at 39. See also Smith, supra note 286, at 1090-
92 (discussion of "heaven born justice").
304. JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 137.
305. Id. at 137-38.
306. Id. at 12.
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exchanging vague for fixed and settled rules and "following and pro-
tecting the solid precedents of popular freedom, by exact learning and
profound reasoning. '30 7 The courts were responsible for conforming
rules of law to the commands of the constitutional amendments and,
in particular, for giving life to the principles introduced by the amend-
ments-the strengthening of the federal government and the replace-
ment of pro-slavery dogmas with the national purpose of endowing
the newly freed race with the immunities and privileges of American
citizenship.3 08 To the Brotherhood, Dred Scott demonstrated that,
even in the United States, jurisprudence "might be made a vehicle of
tyranny";30 9 and, they submitted, if the Court remained under the in-
fluence of prejudice, jurisprudence would again serve not justice, but
the dominions of brute force and arbitrary will.310
In the address to "Their Brethren the Citizens of the United
States of African Descent," 311 the Brotherhood reiterated that "love
of liberty, and of the civic equality of man," principles enscribed in the
Constitution by the recent amendments, were fundamental truths, not
to be weighed "as mere dust in the balance, beside the prejudice of
by-gone slavery," but, instead, to triumph over injustice.312 The man-
dates of the Fourteenth Amendment were fundamental, and their in-
terpretation required
a system of comprehensive principles, not a dispute about words or
doctrines. The great governing, controlling law, which supplies the
link in the change or transition from slavery to freedom, cannot be
construed as a trivial parol contract between citizens; it must be ex-
pounded broadly, understandingly, and conscientiously, as a grave
national compact of freedom with seven millions of adopted
citizens.313
The Fourteenth Amendment declared the "glory of man to be self-
dominion," and was intended to shield the citizen "from civic ostra-
307. Id. at 16.
308. Id. at 16-17.
309. Id. at 17.
310. Id. at 17-18. The text emphasizes the importance of separating judicial decision-making
from the judgments of popular will: "[Tihe wise men of the bench should not necessarily agree
with the opinion of the mass of people," the Brotherhood wrote, "popular notions and circum-
stances which sway unofficial judgments are neither the standards of rectitude nor masters of the
juristic conscience." Id. at 18.
311. Id. at 23-39.
312. Id. at 32-33.
313. Id. at 35-36. The significance the Brotherhood accorded the Fourteenth Amendment
would be hard to overstate. The Fourteenth Amendment represented the textual embodiment
of the restructuring of the nation that was consequent to the Union's victory in the Civil War.
The Fourteenth Amendment "repaired" the Constitution "at the expense of thousands of mil-
lions," and this repair was "cemented by... a profusion of the best blood of the nation .... Id.
at 32-33; see also id. at 35, 503.
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cism and contemptuous attacks. '314 Its doctrine was borne of both the
Declaration of Independence's avowal, "that all men are born free
and equal" and the constitutional maxim that "every rank or character
of citizen is equally subject to the laws."'315 Indeed, the mandate of
the Fourteenth Amendment-i.e. "the universality of that liberty
which makes the meanest member of the state sacred in the glory of
its reflected lustre . . . regardless of class, color, race, creed, or previ-
ous condition"-represented "the grand bond which unites American
citizens, the glory of our common country. ' 316 Can it be, the Brother-
hood asked, that such fundamental principles may be repudiated by
the judiciary?
The main body of Justice and Jurisprudence is rich with discussion
and analysis of the law and worthy of separate study. For purposes of
this article, however, a few themes relating directly to the Civil Rights
Cases should be noted. First, in the opening chapters, Justice and Ju-
risprudence condemns the wide schism between the promise of Amer-
ican law and its enforcement, and suggests that the Court's
jurisprudence was partly to blame. The text, written by the Brother-
hood's Counsel, proposes that a foreign observer would find strange
the discrepancy between the guarantees found in the post-war amend-
ments, which had initially been affirmed by the Supreme Court in
broad statements of principle, and the "anomalous status of the civil
rights of our citizens of African descent. '317 Given the clarity of the
guarantees, the foreign observer would expect that actions to chal-
lenge the denial of civil rights, or the immunities and privileges of citi-
zenship, would involve the trial of a single issue of fact-i.e., whether
or not a plaintiff had suffered unjust discrimination. 318 In fact, how-
314. ld& at 36.
315. l& at 36-37; see also id. at 420 (attributing the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment to
"the heaven-born justice of equality, which the Declaration of Independence proclaimed"). The
book's references to the Declaration and the Constitution reflect distinctly different sets of as-
sumptions about the two documents' authority and flaws. In contrast to the Declaration, which
derived from natural law and contained principles that were binding on expounders of jurispru-
dence, the Constitution had been an imperfect compromise, an arrangement that had grown
more sublime with the addition of the postwar amendments. Nevertheless, Justice and Jurispru-
dence does not support the theory that the unamended Constitution had merely been an instru-
ment of oppression. "It is not true that the Constitution was made exclusively by and for the
white race," the Counsel wrote, "it was established by 'the people of the United States' for
themselves and their posterity .. " Since free persons of color had been citizens of at least five
states and had constituted part of the people of the United States, they numbered among those
for whom the Constitution was established. Id. at 528.
316. Id. at 39. Similar statements about the origin and meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment were reiterated by the Counsel later in the book. See, e.g., id. at 431-33.
317. Id. at 72-75.
318. Id at 73.
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ever, the observer would soon discover that despite pronouncements
of equality, a citizen's complexion determined his standing before the
law.319 In order to uncover the causes of these incongruities, the book
posits a situation in which unbiased characters, like the foreign ob-
server, investigate and discuss the status of civil rights. It then
presents a dialogue between an impartial foreign student, who lacks
the prejudice generated in those influenced by the civil and social en-
vironment of slavery, and the chief justice of the Supreme Court. 320
The dialogue between the student and the chief justice touches on
the intention, meaning, and authority of the postwar amendments and
both the actual and the proper role of the courts in construing the law.
According to these narrators, the amendments were intended to con-
stitute the states and the people as a plural unit-"one country, one
liberty, one destiny."' 321 The amendments incorporated the spirit of
the Declaration of Independence and the divine truth that "all men
are created equal," and, in keeping with these, were intended to
"sweep away every vestige" of the previous condition of slavery.322
Since the amendments granted civil rights to African Americans as
American citizens and since they spoke to the fundamental difference
between "the rights of freedom and wrongs of slavery," their enforce-
ment was not to be subject to fluctuation or sectional bias.3 23 The fact
that the nation passed the amendments in the wake of the war only
heightened their significance. The chief justice opined,
[H]alf a million of lives were lost to secure those very civil rights
which it is asserted a two-penny public servant may now repudiate
because he may lose a dime in his business if the civil rights of one
class of citizens are not sacrificed to the objections of another
class.
32 4
The chief justice and student suggest, further, that by adopting
the amendments, the states incorporated into the Constitution the
proposition that "no man is so humble as to be denied the law's pro-
tection. '' 325 And, since the Constitution was supreme, the guarantees
of the amendments were binding on the states and on their citizens.
319. Id. at 75.
320. See idU at 73-134.
321. Id. at 81.
322. Id. at 80-81.
323. Id. at 88.
324. Id.; see also id. at 98 ("Reform ... required ... a violent, bloody revolution to eradicate
the national error and deep-seated abuses of slavery. At the close of the Civil War the nation
immediately embodied in the Constitution these very amendments, the proudest work of her
power and wisdom.").
325. Id. at 92.
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The Constitution imposed restraints on the states and on individuals,
and, thus, the authority of the amendments extended to the actions of
both states and persons.
326
Why, then, did a disparity exist between the guarantees of equal-
ity promised by the amendments and the status of African Ameri-
cans? The discussants assert that no logic could defend the Court's
repudiation of the Constitution. 327 The Constitution entrusted the
protection of freedom to the Supreme Court 32 8 and, through their en-
abling clauses, the amendments also imposed on Congress the obliga-
tion of safeguarding the "legacy of freedom" bequeathed to African
Americans. 329 The courts were supposed to be calm and in command,
and should have rejected any loose or equivocal constructions of the
amendments. 330  It would be absurd, the student argues, for the
amendments to be interpreted
as if the States, Congress, the common law or the public, had an-
nexed to them a clause providing that "nothing herein contained
shall be so construed as to impair the emoluments which ... hotel-
keepers, common carriers, or the proprietors of places of public re-
sort ... may hereafter receive from citizens who repudiate these
amendments ... [and that such public servants can lawfully] pass
such rules and regulations to establish and maintain a color
line. ... "331
The language of the Fourteenth Amendment should have been con-
strued "as people generally understand it," and not subject to the
whims of popular opinion or special interests.
332
The Court had undermined the authority of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the chief justice explained to the student, because the
issues presented had been framed with dexterity, enabling the Court
to decide civil rights cases in deference to the authority held by public
servants to protect and to guide their vocations.333 But why had com-
mon sense been so trampelled,334 leaving vulnerable the rights of Afri-
can-American citizens? The student suggested the answer: "race-
326. Id. at 91.
327. Id. at 85.
328. Throughout, the book evinces a belief that the federal courts have a singular role to play
in the protection of civil rights. See, e.g., id. at 463 ("The nation has confided the principle of
equality of right by due process of law to the care of her jurisprudents .... ); id. at 473-75 (The
postwar amendments "conferred the fullest authority and power upon the guardian of jurispru-
dence, for the enforcement of the principles of the new system.").
329. Id. at 90.
330. Id. at 117.
331. Id. at 86-87.
332. ld. at 86.
333. Id. at 77-78.
334. Id. at 86.
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instincts in America involve only prejudice against the helplessness of
a fellow-man. ' 335 The discussants conclude that decisions of the
courts that subordinate constitutional mandates to the prerogatives of
public servants were the result of race prejudice and that change in
the law would occur only when courts were filled with judges who
could put prejudice aside and enforce civil rights.336
The text reviewed the central holding of the Civil Rights Cases,
explaining that the Court had found that the Fourteenth Amendment
reached only actions of the state and had restricted the scope of con-
gressional authority. Pursuant to the Cases, Congress could only es-
tablish laws necessary and proper to counteract and to provide redress
for the effects of discriminatory state actions and lacked the power to
provide due process of law for the vindication of civil rights more gen-
erally. Most pointedly, the Court had ruled that Congress lacked the
authority to regulate the conduct of individuals in the states.337 The
text quoted approvingly and at length from Justice Harlan's dissent,
agreeing with Harlan that the Court's construction of the law had de-
feated the ends that the people had desired to accomplish.338 In fact,
the text reminded its readers, the Congress that had enacted the civil
rights bill consisted in large part of members who had proposed the
Fourteenth Amendment-and these "framers" of both the amend-
ment and the bill believed the Act was constitutional.3 39
Later in the book, the Counsel offered additional thoughts on the
meaning of the Civil Rights Act. The Act had declared,
Discriminations against persons, based upon grounds purely arbi-
trary and not recognizable by law, made solely because of certain
physical characteristics, which in no way affected their capacity or
fitness for the privileges and immunities of citizenship, were unlaw-
ful violence, and made them statutory crimes ... .
The aim of the Act was "the overthrow of all unbridled authority and
... that arbitrary power which sought in any form to deprive [African
Americans] of their civil rights," whether such authority was wielded
by the state or public servants.341 The postulates of the legislation
included that no particular color, religion, nor class was exclusively
entitled to freedoms, that equality could legally be diminished by rules
335. Id. at 81.
336. Id. at 111-12.
337. Id. at 147-48, 155-56, 562-63.
338. Id. at 149.
339. Id. at 140, 152.




based on invidious discrimination, that impartial legal protection was
the right of every person, and that the nation's welfare required that
the benefits of the laws governing society should be apportioned
equally. 342 The Act replaced the rule of slavery with "the doctrine of
the equality of man, notwithstanding his color." 343
In the Cases, however, the Court abandoned the nation's new
creed. The Court displayed hostility, departing from the record "to
deliver a grave moral lesson, to utter a pious homily, to school and
discipline colored humanity in the doctrines of humility;... exhorting
it not to walk erect, but more in accordance with the mediaeval gait of
Dred Scott."34 The text quoted from passages of the Court's opinion
that approvingly recounted how in the years before emancipation,
"free colored people" had been discriminated against in the enjoy-
ment of accommodations without considering it an "invasion of [their]
personal status .... "345 The Court had, thus, suggested that it would
be appropriate to model the rights of African Americans in the post-
emancipation era after the condition of free blacks living under the
shadow of Dred Scott, reproached African Americans for seeking
freedom, and deemed extravagant legislation placing American citi-
zens above degradation. 346
Indeed, the Counsel argued, the Court had also subverted the
Thirteenth Amendment, which had been intended to "extirpate the
institutions of slavery. ' 347 It was too apparent for argument that the
refusal by the purveyors of public accommodations to accord African
Americans common privileges was a badge of servitude. The text
maintained, "[T]he perpetuation of any insignia, ceremonialism, em-
blem, device, token, custom, ordinance, rule, or regulation, symbolic
of the previous condition of slavery, and enforced as such, is a gross
invasion of the equality of the race," in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment.34s
342. Id. at 374-75.
343. Id. at 375.
344. Id. at 142.
345. Id. at 142-43.
346. Id. at 143; see also id. at 429 ("[B]y this language of grave import [the Court] admon-
ished the country, that ... it was not expedient to conform American jurisprudence to the ex-
alted standard of morality which had been proposed by the nation, and which the political
reformation of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to enforce.").
347. Id. at 440. "[T]he abolition of slavery or involuntary servitude," the text stated, could
only be interpreted as intending "the substitution of the equality before the law of each individ-
ual in any of the states" and equality throughout the United States "in its broad, Christian,
historical, and political signification." Id. at 470.
348. Id. at 440.
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Despite the destructive force of the Court's ruling, however, the
Fourteenth Amendment remained a powerful force for equality. The
Amendment continued as a formal acknowledgement of the rights,
liberties, immunities, and privileges of citizenship and provided defini-
tion to rights that neither the United States nor the States nor individ-
uals could infringe.349 Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibition of discriminatory state actions remained intact, and Con-
gress retained the authority to adopt appropriate legislation to render
such state laws null and void.350 In addition, the Cases did not impair
the right of citizens, now including African Americans, to obtain judg-
ment in state court for denial of the privileges and immunities to
which they were entitled under state and common law.351 And finally,
all judgments of state courts that infringed on the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment would also continue to be void. Neverthe-
less, the text concluded, if private citizens of the states were to be
permitted to violate the rights of citizenship, "the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment, who also framed the Civil-Rights Bill, have la-
bored in vain .... "352
The remainder of the book focuses principally on Hall v. DeCuir,
in which the Court struck a state statute prohibiting racial segregation
349. Id. at 156.
350. Id. at 157.
351. Id&
352. Id. at 159. Notwithstanding the Court's restriction on the authority delegated to Con-
gress by the Fourteenth Amendment's enabling clause, the text stated, a number of substantive
affirmations could be specified outlining the constitutional status of the civil rights of African
Americans after the Cases. These included: (1) that the Fourteenth Amendment was a valid
compact between the sovereign people of the United States and the citizens of African descent;
(2) that freedmen born or naturalized in the United States were citizens of the United States and
of the states in which they resided; (3) that no state could make any law abridging the privileges
and immunities of the freedmen, nor depriving them of life, liberty, or property without due
process, nor the equal protection of law; (4) that by its adoption, the Fourteenth Amendment
became the supreme law of the land and bound every judge of every state; (5) that privileges and
immunities of citizens included those which constituted the essence of republican citizenship or
those that had been common to citizens in the states under state laws; (6) that African Ameri-
cans became entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states; (7) that
African Americans could not be constitutionally deprived of the "full and unqualified enjoyment
of all such civil immunities and privileges" by state law, custom, or enactment, on account of
their race, color, or previous condition of servitude or for reasons other than those applicable to
every other citizen; (8) that, by virtue of being citizens of the United States, African Americans
were protected against "all discrimination on account of his race" and were entitled to all the
privileges and immunities that states accorded their most favored citizens; (9) that "under the
Fourteenth Amendment, by virtue of section two of article four," the civil rights of African
Americans were not constitutionally subject to any limits interfering with their immunities and
privileges-whether or not they were adopted under color of law-provided such limits were
solely applicable to African Americans and were not applicable alike to all citizens; and (10) that
among other privileges and immunities was the free enjoyment of engaging in all industrial pur-
suits and the free enjoyment of all accommodations "upon the same terms as they are enjoyed
by the citizens of each State." Id. at 160-62.
19951
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
on the ground that the regulation burdened interstate commerce, and,
therefore, invaded an area within the exclusive province of Con-
gress. 353 The text points to Hall as both the turning point in the
Court's treatment of civil rights and the decision that, taken together
with the Civil Rights Cases, both signified the emasculation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and revealed the Court's antagonism toward
the rights of African Americans.
The questions presented to the Supreme Court in Hall were (a)
whether state legislation seeking to impose a direct burden on inter-
state commerce or to interfere with its freedom encroached upon the
exclusive power of Congress; and (b) whether the state statute was,
therefore, unconstitutional.354 The Court found that Louisiana lacked
the authority to require those engaged in interstate transportation to
carry African-American passengers in the same cabin as whites. The
Court reasoned that Congress had exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
interstate commerce, that inaction by Congress was equivalent to a
declaration that commerce should remain free and untrammelled; and
that such an implicit declaration left public servants at liberty to adopt
"such reasonable rules and regulations" for the disposition of
passengers. 355
Justice and Jurisprudence points out that the Hall Court used con-
gressional inaction as an excuse for prohibiting states from protecting
the rights guaranteed by the amendment, and then, effectively nulli-
fied congressional authority to prevent discrimination in the Civil
Rights Cases. As a result, neither the states nor Congress could en-
force the right to travel interstate unhindered by discrimination based
on race, color, or previous condition of servitude.356 Taken together,
Hall and the Cases conferred upon proprietors the "untrammelled"
authority to invalidate the constitutional rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.357 The Court had left the rights of minori-
ties to the discretion of members of the majority, who could and
would cater to the whims of prejudice, 358 a result at odds with the
requirements of a constitutional system.
353. Although a complete analysis of African-American responses to Hall v. DeCuir is be-
yond the scope of this Article, some discussion of Justice and Jurisprudence's treatment of the
case is included in order to capture more fully the book's perspective on the Civil Rights Cases.
354. Id. at 197-98.
355. Id. at 198, 561.
356. Id. at 199-200.
357. Id. at 221, 228.
358. Published in 1889, years after Hall and the Civil Rights Cases, Justice and Jurisprudence
was able to report on the actual consequences of the decisions. "Since the publication of [Hall v.
DeCuir]," the text asserts, for example, "there have been found no dikes or barriers to stem the
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CONCLUSIONS
The record of African-American responses to the Civil Rights
Cases would be impressive alone for the range and depth of discussion
that it reveals. A substantial proportion of the African-American
population in the 1880s knew of the Court's ruling. Thousands of Af-
rican Americans participated in meetings and debated resolutions
concerning the cases, and untold numbers acquired a detailed famili-
arity with the decision by reading accounts disseminated by the black
press. A large number of the African-American leadership not only
evidenced knowledge of the ruling and the dissent, in their particulars,
but also articulated perspectives that addressed the more fundamental
issues of law raised by the Cases.
Yet the record is all the more significant for its depiction of a
tremendously diverse set of reactions, one that reflects both the uniq-
ueness of the individual speakers and writers and variations in their
backgrounds, including differences in geographic location, past experi-
ence, age, educational level, and even economic status. The diversity
of opinion extends to all aspects of the views expressed: for example,
participants in the discourse differed (1) in their levels of optimism
about both the ability of law to change either public opinion or behav-
ior and the potential for white Americans to relent in their racism; (2)
about party politics and the value of allegiance to the Republican
Party; and (3) about which course of action to pursue to secure civil
rights and how confrontational such strategies should be. Perspectives
on questions specifically related to legal theory-for example, the na-
ture and meaning of law, the significance and intention of the postwar
amendments, constitutional interpretation, and the Court's construc-
tion of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments-were similarly
complex and varied.
Nevertheless, general themes and commonalities appear in this
record of perspectives on the law. Most broadly, discussants almost
universally shared a critical position on the outcome of the Cases.359
torrent of illiterate prejudice .... Supported by this authority, the public servants of high and
low degree impudently usurp and overturn the civil rights of [African Americans], as if there
were no Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 360; see also id. at 386 (arguing that ever since Hall,
public servants had subjected African Americans "to humiliating discriminations .. , the very
same conspicuously humiliating badges, the degrading customs and provisions, ignominious
marks, conditions, and ceremonials, which [were notorious] under the antebellum black
code .. "); id. at 428-29 (contending that since the Civil Rights Cases, "barbarizing race-antago-
nism" had increased and that, in response to Hall and the Cases, state courts also refused to
admit African Americans to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens).




More specifically, though, the materials suggest commonality on is-
sues related to the role of law in the American polity, the fundamental
canons of American law, the relationship between positive law and
morality, the meaning of the postwar amendments, and the role of the
courts in interpreting the Constitution. Perspectives converged on
both descriptions of the way law operates, in fact, and beliefs about
how law ought to function.
The common ground evidenced by the materials may have been
created, in part, by the very conditions to which the writers and speak-
ers objected, that is, the continuation of the many forms of discrimina-
tion, degradation, and humiliation suffered by African Americans at
the hands of their white fellow citizens and the barriers faced by Afri-
can Americans attempting to take advantage of the opportunities sug-
gested by their status as citizens. As South Carolina Congressman
Richard Harvey Cain stressed in a speech on the House floor during
the debate over the Civil Rights Bill, for example, the past and pres-
ent everyday experience of being African American in the United
States affected the development of his perspective. 360 Whatever their
origins, the following points of congruence are among those that
emerge from the speeches, articles, editorials, and writings discussed
in the main portion of this Article.
A. Constitutional Democracy and Interpretation of Fundamental
Law
Echoing the words of James Madison, still resonating after a cen-
tury, Frederick Douglass, T. Thomas Fortune, and many of their con-
temporaries argued that the protection of minorities from potential
abuse by majorities was a fundamental purpose of constitutional de-
mocracy and an obligation of its administration. According to this vi-
sion of constitutional democracy, law ought to restrain majorities
(whether groupings are based on race, color, previous condition, or
religion) from perpetuating their advantage at the expense of minori-
ties: indeed, majorities have an obligation to legislate for the good of
all and courts a duty to adjudicate equitably.361 In this vein, Frederick
Douglass asserted that the true object of government "is to protect the
360. "The reason why I know and feel [the need for federal protection of civil rights more
than a white legislator]," stated Cain, "is because my face is painted black and his is painted
white. We who have the color... know and feel all this." Cain, supra note 95, at 329.
361. See, e.g., Fortune, supra note 95, at 129 ("In our government the theory is that no man
shall have advantage before the law to the detriment of his neighbor.").
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weak against the encroachments of the strong."362 Thus, the authority
to protect the rights of citizens and, in particular, to safeguard those
who were part of a despised minority, was an essential quality of gov-
ernment. Without such authority, government lacked legitimacy.
The writers and speakers also took seriously the promise of the
Declaration of Independence and argued that governments are main-
tained for the protection of the "life, liberty and the pursuit of happi-
ness" of their members. 363 The rights proclaimed by the Declaration,
they argued, ought to be enforced by a system of laws. Again, without
the power to protect these fundamental rights, government lacked
legitimacy.364
Many asserted that law should comport with a higher morality
and, consequently, that interpreters of the Constitution should con-
strue the law in accordance with broad moral principles. As more
than one speaker suggested, the Constitution should be interpreted
"in favor of liberty. ' 365 While morality may, today, often seem diffi-
cult to derive or justify, the speakers contended that the distinctions
courts must make when deciding basic issues of civil rights were clear.
"It does not require law books," John W. Anderson, J.C. Delphey,
and Joseph Evans wrote, "to satisfy the intelligent mind as to what is
just and what is unjust."366
Moreover, the consequences of a decision are one measure of its
morality and are, thus, relevant to determinations of law. Writers and
speakers gauged and tested whether a law, action, or decision was in
favor of liberty, versus whether it was oppressive, by experience and
how it would impact people's lives. The columnist "Le Duke" argued,
for example, that the Court's action merited condemnation if, having
considered the effect of removing legal restraints upon evil, members
362. VOICE OF BLACK AMERICA, supra note 95, at 561.
363. See, e.g., R. B. Elliot, A Speech on the Civil Rights Bill, reprinted in CARTER G. WooD-
SON, NEGRO ORATORS AND THmsn ORATIONS 323 (1925) (speech delivered by South Carolina's
Robert Brown Elliott to the United States House of Representatives); Fortune, supra note 1, at
315; John W. Anderson et al., Pittsburgh. A Strong Civil Rights Argument from the Keystone
State-The Atlanta Constitution Roughly Handled, CLEv. GAZETrE, Nov. 24, 1883, at 2; T.
Thomas Fortune, Is There Any Law for the Negro, N.Y. GLOBE, Feb. 17, 1883, at 2.
364. See, e.g., Fortune, supra note 1, at 315; T. Thomas Fortune, Is There Any Law for the
Negro, N.Y. GLOBE, Feb. 17, 1883, at 2.
365. See, e.g., JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 360 (stating that love of liberty
was not to be weighed as "mere dust in the balance" but to triumph over injustice); Douglass,
supra note 33, at 300; Hon. John Mercer Langston Defines Citizenship and the Rights Attaching to
It, N.Y. GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 2.
366. John W. Anderson, et al., Pittsburgk A Strong Civil Rights Argument from the Keystone
State-The Atlanta Constitution Roughly Handled, Ct.v. GAZETE, Nov. 24, 1883, at 2.
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of the Court had still been inclined to declare the Civil Rights Act
unconstitutional.
367
Discussants, thus, argued strongly for a method of interpretation
that would ever attempt to bring the application of law into line with
morality and with the promises of the Declaration. In so doing, they
acknowledged and emphasized the disparity between the ideals and
the reality of the American experiment in constitutional democracy
and engaged in spirited criticism of the Constitution, as well as the
record of judicial interpretation of the constitutional framework. The
Counsel for the Brotherhood of Liberty wrote, for example, of the
conflict that had pervaded judicial interpretation throughout Ameri-
can history between the forces for equality and the impetus for tyr-
anny based on prejudice. 368 All too often, tyranny had prevailed. As
Robert Brown Elliott similarly stated, the civil status of African
Americans had been disputed "at the very formation" of the United
States, "when by a short-sighted policy . . . one Negro counted as
three-fifths of a man .. -369 Although the text of the Constitution
may have been broad enough to embrace the rights of African Ameri-
cans, historically the Court had refused to adopt such constructions.
John Edward Bruce summed up this point, stating that while "[t]he
government of the United States on paper is one of the best govern-
ments that ever saw the light of day.... [p]ractically it is not. ' 370 And
as the Brotherhood of Liberty's Counsel asserted, despite pronounce-
ments of equality, a citizen's complexion determined his standing
before the law.
371
Although the writers and speakers expressed a wide range of
opinion on the ability of law to restrain behavior or alter public opin-
ion, many of those who were most doubtful nevertheless insisted on
the symbolic value of law.372 As Frederick Douglass stated with re-
gard to the Civil Rights Act, though lack of enforcement had rendered
the Act virtually dead, by appealing to the best instincts of all Ameri-
cans and declaring that all were equal citizens, the law nonetheless
had spoken. 373
367. Le Duke, Civil Rights, PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 27, 1883, at 1.
368. JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 440-41.
369. Elliott, supra note 363, at 326.
370. Bruce, supra note 253, at 25.
371. JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 72-75; see also Fortune, supra note 95, at
274 (arguing that theory and practice in the United States "are often sorely out of joint with each
other" when the judiciary is called upon to decide matters between black and white citizens).
372. See, e.g., Onus, Mobile: The Civil Rights Decision. Business Looking Up. Other Notes
of Interest, HUNTSVILLE GAZETTE (Alabama), Nov. 3, 1883, at 3.
373. Douglass, supra note 33, at 305.
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Discussants also expressed strong opinions about appropriate and
inappropriate methods of judicial construction of fundamental law.
The writers and speakers condemned interpretations that seemed ar-
bitrary, reliant on public opinion, or overly formalistic.374 They ar-
gued that the courts ought to construe the Constitution in accordance
with the letter and intent of the law and, again, with guidance from the
spirit of freedom. In this sense, they suggested that the Court ought to
decide constitutional issues in favor of a particular vision of the nature
of American democracy. In fact, the courts had a responsibility to
align the law with its moral underpinnings, and, presaging the ap-
proach developed decades later by the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, a number of the discussants argued
that African Americans should devise a deliberate legal strategy to
press the courts to so conform the law to principles of justice.37
5
Many of the writers and speakers referred to natural rights, which
T. Thomas Fortune defined as those rights from which persons could
not justly be alienated.3 76 Although many relied upon natural rights
or underlying principles of justice as the moral basis for law, to which
law should conform, they clearly distinguished between the moral au-
thority of natural rights and the enforceable power of positive law as
construed by the Court.377 Natural rights became enforceable only
when explicitly imported into positive law, by enactment, judgment,
or custom. The discussants drew upon both positive law and natural
rights, as well as other extratextual sources such as religious beliefs, to
support their critiques of the Cases, and they argued that constitu-
374. See, e.g., id. at 300 (arguing that the Court's judges "ought to live ... an eagle's flight
beyond the reach of fear or favor, praise, or blame, profit or loss"); Jus-cE AND JURISPRU-
DaNCE, supra note 5, at 17-18 (stating, "The wise men of the bench should not necessarily agree
with the opinion of the mass of people .... ).
375. See, e.g., Our Western Letter: Civil Rights Mass Meeting of St. Louis Colored Citizens, at
Which Hon. J. Milton Turner Orates, CLEv. GAZETTE, Dec. 1, 1883, at 4 (suggesting the use of
test cases to challenge discriminatory practices); Waring, supra note 286, at 503-04 (outlining the
strategy envisioned by the Brotherhood of Liberty to bring test cases in the courts to challenge
infringement of civil rights nationwide).
376. Fortune, supra note 95, at 123.
377. See Douglass, supra note 33, at 301-02 (stating both that decisions of the Court are law
and that its rulings could be judged by a higher moral code). The Brotherhood of Liberty's
Counsel also recognized and maintained the distinction between natural rights and positive law,
for instance, in arguing that Hall v. DeCuir demonstrated that "an inflexible rule of natural right,
incorporated into the organic law may be overturned." JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 5, at 307; see also id. at 358 (emphasizing that, with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the tenets of natural law were reduced to writing and, thus, made part of the organic law);
Fortune, supra note 95, at 121-23 (arguing, for example, that "holding property in man" was a
"crime," although acknowledging its legal status in the United States before the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment); Bruce, supra note 253, at 20.
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tional interpretation should be based on and consistent with both pos-
itive law and natural rights.
B. The Significance of the Postwar Amendments
The writers and speakers repeatedly emphasized the significance
of the postwar amendments, which they viewed as essentially reconsti-
tuting the nation. The Counsel to the Brotherhood of Liberty stated,
for example, that the amendments "introduced into the Constitution a
new, fundamental civil system" with the "deepest constitutional signif-
icance. ' 378 The amendments, and especially the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, represented a command for justice in American law3 79 and were
the textual embodiment of the Union's victory over the secessionists
and pro-slavery forces in the nation's bloody civil war-i.e., the re-
structuring of both the federal system and of the relations between the
central government and its citizens. 38° The amendments unequivo-
cally transformed into positive law natural rights, which were based on
the spirit of liberty and of the civic equality of all persons, and, in so
doing, grafted onto the Constitution the promises of the Declaration
of Independence.
The amendments so fundamentally altered the constitutional
framework of the nation, the writers and speakers argued, that they
should be construed broadly, in light of their origin and historical,
political and religious meaning and context. 381 According to the
Brotherhood of Liberty, for example, interpretation of the mandates
of the Fourteenth Amendment required "a system of comprehensive
principles, not a dispute about words or doctrines. ' '38
2
T. Thomas Fortune and others also argued that the postwar
amendments were intended in letter and spirit to enlarge the powers
of the federal government in relation to the states.3 83 The "States'
rights" theory of John Calhoun had been a casualty of war that the
amendments finally put to rest. Discussants generally viewed the
transfer of power to the national government as a development in
favor of liberty, as they feared abuse of power by the central govern-
378. Jus-icE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 484.
379. See, e.g., id. at 12.
380. See, eg., id. at 32-33 (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment "repaired" the Consti-
tution "at the expense of thousands of millions," and that this repair was "cemented by ... a
profusion of the best blood of the nation").
381. See e.g., id. at 471-73.
382. Id. at 35.
383. See, e.g., Fortune, supra note 95, at 122-23; JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5,
at 16-17.
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ment less than tyranny of majorities over minorities within the
states.384
Thus they argued that the amendments had affirmed and
strengthened a direct reciprocal relationship between the nation and
its citizenry, and, indeed, had clarified that the rights associated with
this relationship were not to be mediated by the states.385 Many as-
serted, with Fortune, that only the "most sanguinary warfare," the
Union victory, and the subsequent passage of the constitutional
amendments enabled African Americans to acquire the status of full-
fledged citizens. 386
Moreover, the writers and speakers viewed the postwar amend-
ments as a compact between the national government and the freed
race, its new citizenry. 387 They saw this compact as hard-earned and,
although many shied away from explicitly stating so, overdue.388 The
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, in particular, were intended
specifically to eradicate discrimination against African Americans and
to endow the race with the privileges and immunities of American
citizenship. 389
The Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery and involun-
tary servitude meant more than the elimination of the formal trap-
pings of slavery. "As we walked out of slavery," John Mercer
Langston stated, "we walked into citizenship.' ' 39° The Thirteenth
Amendment was intended to secure the rights of the freedmen and to
provide the federal government with the authority to protect these
rights.391 The discussants argued that the Thirteenth Amendment em-
384. See, e.g., T. Thomas Forture, N.Y. GLOBE, Feb. 17,1883, reprinted in TiE BLACK PREss,
supra note 107, at 163 ("While the tyranny which has always flowed from centralized govern-
ment is obviated, no check is placed upon the tyranny of the individual state ... ").
385. See, e.g., Open Letter from Bishop Henry McNeal Turner to Professor B. K. Sampson
(Nov. 6, 1883), in RESPECr BLACK, supra note 33, at 62 (arguing that it was the national govern-
ment, not the states, that had granted citizenship and was intended to protect the rights of
citizenship).
386. Fortune, supra note 95, at 122, 124.
387. See e.g., JusrIcE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 35-36 (describing the Four-
teenth Amendment as "a grave national compact of freedom with seven millions of adopted
citizens").
388. See, e.g., R. B. Elliott, supra note 363, at 309-10, 327 (invoking the bravery and patriot-
ism African Americans demonstrated during the War of Independence, the War of 1812, and the
Civil War in support of appeals for the constitutional protection of civil rights).
389. See, e.g., JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 10, 16-17, 438.
390. The Civil Rights Law: Hon. John Mercer Langston Defines Citizenship and the Rights
Attaching to It, N.Y. GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 2.
391. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Law: Hon. John Mercer Langston Defines Citizenship and the
Rights Attaching to It, N.Y. GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1883, at 2; REsPEcr BLACK, supra note 33, at 68
(Henry McNeal Turner) (stating, "The intention [of the powers amending the Constitution] was
to entirely free, not to partly liberate.").
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powered Congress to legislate for the eradication of not only the insti-
tution of slavery, but also its badges and incidents, including those
rules and practices in civil society denoting racial inferiority.392 As the
Brotherhood of Liberty's Counsel wrote, the abolition of slavery
could only be interpreted as intending "the substitution of the equality
before the law of each individual in any of the states" and equality
throughout the United States "in its broad, Christian, historical, and
political signification. ' 393 The perpetuation of any insignia, device,
custom, rule, or regulation symbolic of the previous condition of slav-
ery and enforced as such was, therefore, a violation of the mandate of
the Thirteenth Amendment.394
Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment secured positive rights and
privileges, including, for example, the right to travel, "subject only to
such rules as were alike applicable to all travellers without regard to
color .... ,,395 As stated by the Counsel to the Brotherhood of Liberty,
the privileges and immunities of American citizenship were to be
measured by those rights enjoyed "by all other American citizens in
their industrial business [and] pursuit of pleasure .... -396 Discussants
argued that, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, these privileges
and immunities, or "civil rights," could not legally be subjected to con-
ditions, rules, and regulations that were solely applicable to citizens of
a particular race or color.3
97
Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to relieve
African-American citizens from the effects of prejudice and to protect
essential rights from infringement without regard to the instrument of
invasion. 398 In the words of the Brotherhood of Liberty's Counsel, if
private citizens of the states were permitted to violate the rights of
citizenship, "the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment... have la-
bored in vain .... ,,399 "What does it matter to a colored citizen," ar-
gued Frederick Douglass, "that a State may not insult and outrage him
if a citizen of a State may?" 4°° In the view of the writers and speakers,
392. See, e.g., RESPECT BLACK, supra note 33, at 68-69 (Henry McNeal Turner).
393. JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 470.
394. Id. at 440.
395. Id. at 222.
396. Id. at 139; see also id. at 169 (stating that the rights, immunities, and privileges of free-
dom conferred by the amendments included the ability, unhampered by racial discrimination, to
"form alliances by means of trade and business," as well as "the unrestricted privileges of civil
intercourse.").
397. Id. at 139, 170.
398. See, e.g., id. at 302-04.
399. Id. at 159.
400. Douglass, supra note 33, at 304-05.
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the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had intended to protect
African Americans from injustice, not merely from the states, but
from individuals within the states.401
The discussants asserted that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments were intended to expand congressional powers.402 They
agreed with Justice Harlan that the enabling clause granted Congress
the power to enforce all provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
not merely those clauses interpreted to prohibit only discriminatory
state action.
C. Criticism of the Cases
Criticism of the Court's opinion converged along a number of
lines. First, discussants argued that the decision was contrary to the
dictates of positive law and in violation of the mandates of morality.
More specifically, the Court had departed from established forms of
reasoning in its interpretation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments and application of precedent, and, in so doing, had de-
feated the letter and spirit of the amendments.40 3 The Justices failed
to construe the amendments broadly, in the spirit in which they had
been passed.
Many of the discussants argued that the decision had turned a
blind eye to the expansion of federal powers intended by the postwar
amendments by refusing to grant the national government the ability
and authority to protect the rights of citizenship. "[I1n my opinion,"
stated Blanche K. Bruce, "[the decision is] the revival of Calhoun's
theory of State rights."404 Although the Court had not been candid
about the retrograde underpinnings of its decision, the Cases in fact
resurrected prewar doctrines of state sovereignty.40 5
Moreover, the Cases relegated to the states the responsibility for
protecting rights guaranteed by the Constitution, knowing that, as a
result, such rights would be vulnerable to invasion. The Court, thus,
401. See, e.g., id.
402. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Harlan's Opinion of Civil Rights, N. Y. GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1883, at 2.
403. See, e.g., Geo. B. Vashon, Another View of the Decision: Further Legislation Declared
Necessary, N.Y. GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1883, at 1 (arguing that the Court had ignored "the spirit of the
law," "nursed and cherished errors of expression and trampled on the will of the people").
404. Civil Rights Decision: View of Leading Colored Men, HursviLLE GAZETE (Ala-
bama), Oct. 20, 1883, at 2.
405. See, e.g., Bruce, supra note 253, at 21; Hon. John P. Green, Civil Rights: Deep Game
Being Played by Arthur Politicians-What Next?, CLEv. GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 1883, at 2. Similarly,
the Brotherhood's Counsel argued that the Court had displayed its hostility in passages of the
opinion in which the Court suggested use of the pre-war rights of "free" African Americans as a
model for postemancipation freedom. JUsTIcE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 142-43.
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left the rights of minorities to the discretion of members of the major-
ity, choosing to ignore the likely consequences of its judgment. By
refusing Congress the authority to protect the rights of citizenship, the
Court essentially denied African Americans the rights to which they
were entitled, rights that they had earned with their blood, service,
and bravery.4 6
Many writers and speakers argued that the Constitution was
broad enough to shield African Americans in their civil and political
rights,40 7 and that, therefore, the Court's opinion was not compelled
by the terms of the Constitution. Indeed, the Court's stated justifica-
tions masked the true basis for the outcome of the Cases, which was,
at least in part, either crudely political or based on racial bias.408 As
the chief justice and student in Justice and Jurisprudence concluded,
decisions of the courts that subordinated constitutional mandates to
the prerogatives of public servants, such as were made in the Cases
and Hall v. DeCuir, were the result of race prejudice.40 9 "I look upon
[the Cases] as one more shocking development of that moral weak-
ness in high places. . . ," declared Frederick Douglass.410
The discussants argued, in particular, that the Court applied dif-
ferent rules of interpretation to achieve particular outcomes. The in-
consistency between the Court's decisions in the Cases and Dred Scott,
for example, revealed the Court's hidden agenda. "0 for a Supreme
Court of the United States which shall be as true to the claims of hu-
manity as the Supreme court formerly was to the demands of slavery!"
Frederick Douglass declared.411 Where the Court had relied on the
intention of the framers to support its protection for the "property
rights" of slave owners, Douglass and others argued, it now "utterly
ignored and rejected the force and application of object and intention
as a rule of interpretation. '412 Why did the Court now find congres-
sional authority more constricted, despite the ratification of amend-
ments to the Constitution that were intended to have the opposite
effect? "Is it because the aggrieved are black freemen and not white
slave drivers?" T. Thomas Fortune asked rhetorically.413 To Fortune
406. See, e.g., Fortune, supra note 1, at 315.
407. See, e.g., Bruce, supra note 253, at 25; Mr. Justice Harlan's Opinion of Civil Rights, N.Y.
GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1883, at 2.
408. See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 33, at 305.
409. JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 111-12.
410. Douglass, supra note 33, at 298.
411. Id. at 303-04.
412. Id. at 303.
413. Mr. Justice Harlan's Opinion of Civil Rights, N.Y. GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1883, at 2.
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and the many others whose views have been preserved in the histori-
cal record, the answer was clear.

